US 11387982

US patent 11387982B2 information is summarized below:

Title: Method for authenticating a hash of a data packet from collected context data based on a hash distance generation step, first authentication device, second authentication device, and authentication system

Assignee: Thales DIS France SAS

Inventors: Fabrice Delhoste, Frédéric PAILLART, Sébastien PETIT

Filing Date: 2018-11-19

Issue Date: 2022-07-12

Abstract: The invention relates to an authentication method. The method comprises: collecting, based on a predetermined authentication policy, at least one context data element; constituting, based on the at least one collected context data element, a data packet; generating, by using a predetermined hash type algorithm and the data packet, as input to the predetermined hash type algorithm, a hash; sending the generated hash; generating, as a hash distance generation step, a hash distance between the generated hash and a predetermined reference hash; and authenticating successfully or not based on the generated hash distance, as an authentication step. The invention also relates to corresponding device and system.

Plain-Language Overview of Independent Claims:

Claim 1 (Authentication Method):
This claim describes a method for authentication involving several steps. First, a system collects one or more pieces of "context data" (information about the environment or user), guided by a predefined "authentication policy." This context data, which is specifically a captured image represented as a fixed-length string of bits, is then used to form a "data packet." Next, a hash (a byte stream) is generated from this data packet using a specific hashing algorithm. This generated hash is then sent to another device. Upon receipt, a "hash distance" is calculated, comparing the newly generated hash to a previously stored "predetermined reference hash." Finally, the authentication is deemed successful or not based on this calculated hash distance.

Claim 8 (First Authentication Device):
This claim describes a "first authentication device" (e.g., a mobile phone or PC) that is configured to perform the initial steps of the authentication method. Specifically, this device collects at least one context data element (a captured image as a fixed-length string of bits) according to an authentication policy. It then forms a data packet from this collected data. The device generates a hash (a byte stream) from this data packet using a predetermined hash algorithm and then sends this generated hash to a "second authentication device."

Claim 10 (Authentication System):
This claim outlines an entire "authentication system" comprising both a "first authentication device" and at least one "second authentication device." The first authentication device is configured to perform the actions described in Claim 8: collect context data (a captured image as a fixed-length string of bits), constitute a data packet, generate a hash (a byte stream) using a predetermined hash algorithm, and send it to the second device. The second authentication device, in turn, is configured to receive this generated hash, calculate a "hash distance" between the received hash and a predetermined reference hash, and then authenticate (or not) based on this hash distance.

CAFC 2026 Dockets:

The Google Patents page for US11387982B2 indicates that a PTAB case IPR2026-00278 was filed and is pending. The PTAB (Patent Trial and Appeal Board) is part of the USPTO, not the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC). Therefore, direct CAFC docket information for IPR2026-00278 would not be available, as it is an active PTAB proceeding. To check the status of IPR2026-00278, one would typically search the PTAB's own case tracking system. No CAFC dockets for 2026 related to US11387982 were found in the search results.

Based on a review of the patent US11387982's legal status, there is known litigation involving this patent.

Specifically, an Inter Partes Review (IPR) case has been filed:

• Case Number: IPR2026-00278
• Jurisdiction: Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), United States
• Plaintiff(s): The petitioner is associated with "Unified Patents PTAB Data", suggesting Unified Patents is the petitioner.
• Defendant(s): Thales DIS France SAS, as the current assignee of US11387982, would be the patent owner defending the patent in this IPR.
• Filing Date: The case number IPR2026-00278 indicates it was filed in 2026.
• Current Status: Pending

Additionally, the patent's legal status indicates "Family has litigation" and "First worldwide family litigation filed", but specific details (plaintiffs, defendants, jurisdiction, case number, filing date, and outcome or current status) for this broader family litigation are not provided in the readily available patent information.

Proceedings overview

One Inter Partes Review (IPR) proceeding, IPR2026-00278, is currently pending against US patent 11387982. This IPR is in its early stages, with the institution decision not yet issued. Therefore, the patent's claims remain untested by a final PTAB decision, and its defensive posture is currently one of uncertainty pending the outcome of this active proceeding.

IPR2026-00278 — Okta, Inc. et al. v. Thales DIS France SAS

• Type: Inter Partes Review
• Filed: 2026-02-27
• Status: Pending — The proceeding has been filed but has not yet reached an institution decision or a final written decision.
• Judge panel: The judge panel has not been publicly announced for this pending proceeding.
• Petition grounds: The specific claims challenged, prior art references, and statutory bases (§ 102 / § 103 / § 112) asserted by Okta, Inc. et al. in their petition are not publicly available in the search results at this early stage.
• Institution decision: Not yet issued. The statutory deadline for an institution decision is typically six months from the filing date of the petition, which would be around August 27, 2026.
• Final Written Decision: Not issued.
• Settlement / termination: No settlement or termination has been reported for this active, pending proceeding.
• Appeal: Not applicable, as no Final Written Decision has been issued.
• Defensive value: This IPR proceeding represents an active challenge to the patentability of claims in US11387982. While its outcome is unknown, if instituted and claims are found unpatentable, it could significantly weaken the patent owner's assertion position. For a defendant, this means there is an ongoing effort to invalidate the patent, and monitoring its progress is crucial.

Strategic summary

US patent 11387982 is currently facing a single Inter Partes Review, IPR2026-00278, initiated by Okta, Inc. et al. The proceeding is in its nascent stages, having been filed on 2026-02-27 and currently holding a "Pending" status. As of the current date, no claims of US11387982 have been canceled or sustained by a PTAB final written decision. All claims remain untested by a PTAB trial outcome. The patent owner for US11387982 is Thales DIS France SAS.

Given the early stage of IPR2026-00278, the estoppel landscape under § 315(e)(2) is not yet applicable. If the IPR is instituted, the petitioner (Okta, Inc. et al.) and its privies would be estopped from asserting grounds raised or that reasonably could have been raised in the IPR in subsequent district court or ITC litigation. For other potential defendants, all prior-art grounds remain available until a Final Written Decision is issued. There are no clear pattern signals of multiple IPRs from the same petitioner on this patent, aggressive PTAB appeals by the patent owner, or involvement of defensive aggregators, as this is the only proceeding identified.

Recommended next steps

• Monitor the progress of IPR2026-00278 closely, especially for the institution decision, which is expected around August 27, 2026. This decision will be a critical milestone, indicating whether the PTAB believes the petitioner has shown a reasonable likelihood that at least one challenged claim is unpatentable.
• Access the public docket for IPR2026-00278 on the USPTO PTAB E2E system (or through the USPTO Open Data Portal) to review the petition and subsequent filings. This will reveal the specific claims challenged, the prior art asserted, and the legal arguments made by Okta, Inc. et al. against patent US11387982.

Inventors

• Fabrice Delhoste (Thales DIS France SAS)
• Frédéric PAILLART (Thales DIS France SAS)
• Sébastien PETIT (Thales DIS France SAS)

No unusual patterns detected regarding inventors departing the original assignee.

Original assignee

Thales DIS France SAS.
Thales DIS France SAS is primarily involved in digital security, including identity and data protection. They ship products embodying the claims, specifically in secure elements and authentication solutions. Thales DIS France SAS is an operating company.

Assignment timeline

• 2021-01-11 (executed) / recorded 2021-01-20 — Reel 054960/0332

  • Conveyance: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST
  • Assignor: DELHOSTE, FABRICE; PAILLART, FREDERIC; PETIT, SEBASTIEN
  • Assignee: THALES DIS FRANCE SA
  • Correspondent: THALES NORTH AMERICA INC., C/O SUSAN M. KENDALL 2200 WOBURN ST. SUITE 100, WILMINGTON MA 01887.
  • Context: Internal reorg (transfer from individual inventors to a corporate entity).

• 2021-12-15 (executed) / recorded 2022-02-04 — Reel 058884/0238

  • Conveyance: ASSIGNMENT OF ASSIGNORS INTEREST
  • Assignor: THALES DIS FRANCE SA
  • Assignee: THALES DIS FRANCE SAS
  • Correspondent: THALES NORTH AMERICA INC., C/O SUSAN M. KENDALL 2200 WOBURN ST. SUITE 100, WILMINGTON MA 01887. This correspondent recurs in this chain.
  • Context: Internal reorg (transfer between related corporate entities, likely a name change or restructuring).

Timeline diagram

timeline
    title Ownership of US 11387982
    2018 : Filed by Thales DIS France SAS
    2021 : Inventors assign to Thales DIS France SA
    2022 : Thales DIS France SA assigns to Thales DIS France SAS
         : Patent issued

NPE / troll-pattern signals

1. Shell-entity transfer — not present. The transfers are between entities within the Thales group, which is an operating company.
2. Known asserter in the chain — not present. Neither Thales DIS France SA nor Thales DIS France SAS appear on public NPE lists.
3. Repeat correspondent across the chain — present. The correspondent "THALES NORTH AMERICA INC., C/O SUSAN M. KENDALL 2200 WOBURN ST. SUITE 100, WILMINGTON MA 01887" appears on both recorded assignments (Reel 054960/0332 and Reel 058884/0238). This indicates consistent internal legal representation for the Thales entities.
4. Cascading transfers — not present. There are two transfers over approximately one year, both within the Thales corporate structure. This does not indicate rapid, speculative transfers between unrelated LLCs.
5. Pre-litigation transfer — unclear. There is no information provided about litigation involving this patent, so it's not possible to determine if transfers occurred within 6 months of a first infringement suit.
6. Bankruptcy fire-sale — not present. There is no indication that Thales DIS France SAS or its predecessors filed for bankruptcy.
7. Privateering — not present. There is no evidence from SEC filings or other sources to suggest Thales is using an NPE to assert patents on its behalf.
8. Defensive aggregator (anti-NPE) — not present. The chain does not end at a known defensive aggregator.

Verdict

Insufficient data. While two assignments are recorded, they appear to be internal reorganizations within the Thales group, a known operating company. Without information on litigation or other transfers, it's not possible to confidently classify this patent as being asserted by an NPE. The presence of a repeat correspondent is noted, but in this context, it aligns with internal corporate legal representation rather than an NPE pattern.

USPTO Assignment Center search page: https://assignmentcenter.uspto.gov/

The initial search for "US patent 11387982 USPTO" confirms that the patent exists and provides links to the USPTO search tools. The provided patent text is authoritative, so I will proceed using the citation information directly from it, and supplement with searches for specific descriptions if needed.

Here's an analysis of the most relevant prior art for US11387982, based on the citations provided within the patent text and considering potential anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102.

US11387982: Method for authenticating a hash of a data packet from collected context data based on a hash distance generation step, first authentication device, second authentication device, and authentication system

The independent claims of US11387982 are:

• Claim 1 (Method): Requires collecting context data (specifically a captured image as a fixed-length string of bits), constituting a data packet, generating a hash using a predetermined hash type algorithm, sending the hash, generating a hash distance between the generated hash and a reference hash, and authenticating based on this distance. The hash is a byte stream generated from the fixed-length string of bits.
• Claim 8 (First Authentication Device): Configured to perform the collection, data packet constitution, hash generation, and sending steps of Claim 1.
• Claim 9 (Second Authentication Device): Configured to receive the hash, generate the hash distance, and authenticate based on the hash distance.
• Claim 10 (Authentication System): Combines the first and second authentication devices and their respective functionalities as described above.

The distinguishing features of US11387982, particularly as articulated in its summary and problem statement, include:

• Reduced bandwidth: Transmitting a hash (few kbytes) instead of raw video/image data (several Mb).
• Data privacy: The hash obfuscates original context data, unlike plain text transmission.
• Resilience to small changes: Using hash distance (e.g., LSH) allows authentication even with slight variations in collected context data.

The patent specifically criticizes EP 2 924 603 A2 in its "State of the Art" section, making it a highly relevant piece of prior art.

Most Relevant Prior Art for US11387982

1. EP2924603A2
   • Full Citation: EP2924603A2 - Fmr Llc, "Method and system for user authentication based on biometrics, clothes wearing and surrounding scene"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2015-09-30; Priority date: 2014-03-25.
   • Brief Description: This patent describes a user authentication technique where a client sends a captured video signal (including physical user characteristics and environmental objects) to a server. The server analyzes the video signal to determine values associated with visual and audio elements, calculates a total score, and compares it to a predetermined reference score for authorization. The present patent US11387982 explicitly identifies this prior art and highlights its drawbacks: requiring significant bandwidth due to transmitting the full video signal (several Mb) and disclosing private user environment data in plain text.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): EP2924603A2 anticipates the general concept of collecting context data (video signal including user characteristics and environment), sending it to a server, and authenticating based on a comparison to a reference. However, it does not anticipate the specific claimed features of US11387982, particularly:
     • Generating a hash from the collected context data. EP2924603A2 transmits the raw video signal.
     • Generating a hash distance between the generated hash and a predetermined reference hash. EP2924603A2 calculates a "total score" from direct analysis of the video signal, not a hash distance.
     • The "wherein" clauses of Claim 1 (context data as captured image represented as fixed-length string of bits for constituting a data packet, and hash as a byte stream generated from said string of bits).
       Therefore, it does not anticipate Claim 1, 8, or 10, as it lacks the core hashing and hash distance comparison steps.

1. US20150096023A1
   • Full Citation: US20150096023A1 - Fireeye, Inc., "Fuzzy hash of behavioral results"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2015-04-02; Priority date: 2013-09-30.
   • Brief Description: This application describes systems and methods for determining the similarity between behavioral results (e.g., from malware analysis) using fuzzy hashing. Fuzzy hashes allow for similarity detection even if the underlying data has slight variations, which is a core concept for the hash distance in US11387982. The application relates to generating a fuzzy hash and comparing it to a reference fuzzy hash.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This patent application is highly relevant because it describes the use of "fuzzy hashing" for similarity detection, which is directly analogous to the "hash distance generation step" and the use of algorithms like LSH (Locality Sensitive Hash) mentioned in US11387982. It covers:
     • Generating a hash (fuzzy hash).
     • Comparing hashes to determine similarity (hash distance).
       However, its context is "behavioral results" (e.g., malware), not general "context data elements" like images of a user or a TV set. It also does not explicitly describe the "collecting... at least one context data element" and "constituting a data packet" in the manner of US11387982, nor the specific "wherein" clauses of Claim 1 (captured image as fixed-length string of bits, hash as byte stream from said string of bits). While it anticipates the technique of fuzzy hashing and similarity comparison for authentication, it does not fully disclose the application to diverse context data elements as defined in US11387982's Claim 1.
       Therefore, it does not anticipate Claim 1, 8, or 10 as it lacks the specific context data collection and packet constitution. However, it directly anticipates the technical principle of "generating a hash distance" and using fuzzy/LSH type algorithms (as detailed in dependent Claim 2).

1. US9594906B1
   • Full Citation: US9594906B1 - Juniper Networks, Inc., "Confirming a malware infection on a client device using a remote access connection tool to identify a malicious file based on fuzzy hashes"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2017-03-14; Priority date: 2015-03-31.
   • Brief Description: This patent describes confirming malware infections by calculating fuzzy hashes of files on a client device and comparing them to fuzzy hashes of known malicious files. This is another example of applying fuzzy hashing for similarity detection in a security context.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Similar to US20150096023A1, this patent utilizes fuzzy hashes for comparison and detection of similar (malicious) files. It reinforces the concept of generating hashes that are resilient to small changes and comparing them. However, its specific application is malware detection from files, not context data elements like images or environmental data for general authentication. It lacks the steps of collecting context data from the environment, constituting a data packet from it, and specifically using captured images as fixed-length strings of bits.
     Thus, it does not anticipate Claim 1, 8, or 10 for similar reasons as US20150096023A1, but it is highly relevant to the "hash distance generation step" and the underlying technology described in dependent Claim 2.

1. US20140108800A1
   • Full Citation: US20140108800A1 - David Lawrence, "System and method for improved geothentication based on a hash function"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2014-04-17; Priority date: 2012-10-16.
   • Brief Description: This application describes a "geothentication" method where a hash function is applied to geolocation data to improve security and privacy for location-based authentication.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This prior art describes collecting "context data" (geolocation data), applying a hash function, and using the hash for authentication. This broadly covers some elements of Claim 1, namely "collecting... at least one context data element," "generating a hash... and the data packet, as input," and "sending the generated hash." However, it does not disclose:
     • Generating a hash distance between the generated hash and a predetermined reference hash. Instead, it uses a hash for direct authentication.
     • Authenticating based on the hash distance.
     • The specific "wherein" clauses of Claim 1 (captured image as fixed-length string of bits, hash as byte stream from said string of bits). While geolocation data is a "context data element", it's not a "captured image represented as a string of bits with a fixed length".
       Therefore, it does not anticipate Claim 1, 8, or 10 because it lacks the crucial "hash distance" generation and authentication step, and the specific nature of the context data element.

1. US9514753B2
   • Full Citation: US9514753B2 - Google Inc., "Speaker identification using hash-based indexing"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2016-12-06; Priority date: 2013-11-04.
   • Brief Description: This patent describes methods for identifying speakers using hash-based indexing. Audio data is converted into features, hashed, and then compared to indexed hashes for identification. This involves generating hashes from biometric (voice) data and comparing them.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This patent involves collecting biometric "context data" (speaker's voice), processing it (feature extraction), hashing it, and comparing the hash for identification. This is broadly similar to elements of Claim 1. However, it focuses on "speaker identification" using "hash-based indexing" which implies direct matching rather than a flexible "hash distance" for authentication that allows for slight changes in the environment, as emphasized in US11387982. Also, the context data is audio, not specifically a "captured image represented as a string of bits with a fixed length," and it doesn't explicitly describe constituting a "data packet" in the same way. The comparison for identification might be a form of "hash distance" but it's not explicitly framed as "authenticating based on the generated hash distance" allowing for "more or less small changes" as described in US11387982.
     Therefore, it does not anticipate Claim 1, 8, or 10 due to the lack of explicit hash distance for flexible authentication and the specific nature of the "captured image" context data.

1. US20170109514A1
   • Full Citation: US20170109514A1 - Sri International, "Continuous authentication of mobile device users"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2017-04-20; Priority date: 2014-12-18.
   • Brief Description: This application details systems and methods for continuous authentication of mobile device users based on various user and device characteristics (context data) collected over time.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This patent involves collecting "context data" (user and device characteristics) for authentication. While it broadly falls under the umbrella of context-based authentication, it does not explicitly describe the crucial steps of:
     • Generating a hash from the collected context data.
     • Generating a hash distance between the generated hash and a reference hash.
     • Authenticating based on the hash distance.
     • The specific "wherein" clauses of Claim 1 concerning a captured image and its representation.
       Thus, it does not anticipate Claim 1, 8, or 10 as it lacks the core hashing and hash distance comparison elements.

1. US20080181403A1
   • Full Citation: US20080181403A1 - Yu Sakamoto, "Authenticating system, authenticating method, and authenticating program"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2008-07-31; Priority date: 2007-01-25.
   • Brief Description: This patent describes an authentication system that includes receiving authentication information, generating authentication data, comparing it with registered authentication data, and authenticating. The authentication information could be user inputs or environmental data.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This patent broadly covers authentication using various types of data and comparison. However, it does not specify the use of hashing the collected context data to form a data packet, generating a hash distance for authentication, nor the specific "wherein" clauses of Claim 1. The comparison is generally between "authentication data" and "registered authentication data," which is less specific than the "hash distance" concept of US11387982.
     Therefore, it does not anticipate Claim 1, 8, or 10.

1. US20040221153A1
   • Full Citation: US20040221153A1 - [[Samsung Electronics Co.](/litigations/by-defendant/Samsung%20Electronics%20Co.), Ltd.](/litigations/by-plaintiff/Samsung%20Electronics%20Co.%2C%20Ltd.), "Apparatus and method of enciphering data packet of variable width"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2004-11-04; Priority date: 2003-02-06.
   • Brief Description: This application focuses on methods and apparatus for enciphering data packets, particularly those with variable widths. While it deals with data packets and security, it is primarily concerned with encryption techniques for data transmission.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This patent is concerned with ciphering data packets, which is an optional step mentioned in US11387982 (e.g., Claim 6 and its description). It does not, however, disclose the core elements of US11387982's independent claims, such as collecting context data, generating a hash from it, creating a hash distance, and authenticating based on that distance. It would not anticipate the independent claims (1, 8, 9, 10), but could be considered relevant to the dependent claim involving ciphering (Claim 6).

1. US20060020796A1
   • Full Citation: US20060020796A1 - Microsoft Corporation, "Human input security codes"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2006-01-26; Priority date: 2003-03-27.
   • Brief Description: This application describes generating human input security codes (e.g., CAPTCHAs) to distinguish humans from automated processes. It involves presenting challenges and verifying human responses.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This patent focuses on human interaction and CAPTCHA-like mechanisms for security. It is not related to collecting environmental or contextual data for authentication using hash distances. It does not anticipate any claims of US11387982.

1. WO2016083216A1
   • Full Citation: WO2016083216A1 - Gemalto Sa, "Method for accessing media data and corresponding device and system"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2016-06-02; Priority date: 2014-11-28.
   • Brief Description: This application describes methods for accessing media data, possibly with authentication mechanisms. The title is quite broad, and without further details, its direct relevance to hash distance authentication from context data is not immediately clear.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Without more specific details about the authentication method in WO2016083216A1, it's difficult to assess precise anticipation. However, based on the title, it likely covers general access control for media, rather than the specific hash distance authentication mechanism for context data as claimed in US11387982. It is unlikely to anticipate Claim 1, 8, 9, or 10.

1. US20160323243A1
   • Full Citation: US20160323243A1 - Cirius Messaging Inc., "Data leak protection system and processing methods thereof"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication date: 2016-11-03; Priority date: 2015-05-01.
   • Brief Description: This application describes systems and methods for data leak protection, often involving scanning and identifying sensitive information within data streams or files.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This patent is focused on data leak protection, which might involve hashing for content identification or integrity, but it does not describe an authentication method based on collecting environmental context data, generating a hash distance from it, and using that distance for authentication. It does not anticipate any claims of US11387982.

Summary of Most Relevant Prior Art and Anticipation:

The most relevant prior art appears to be EP2924603A2, US20150096023A1, and US9594906B1.

• EP2924603A2 is the closest in problem domain (context/environment authentication) and explicitly discussed as prior art in US11387982. It teaches collecting context data (video) and authenticating based on a score derived from it. However, it specifically lacks the crucial hashing and hash-distance comparison steps, which are the inventive core of US11387982. Therefore, it does not anticipate Claim 1, 8, or 10.
• US20150096023A1 and US9594906B1 are highly relevant to the technical mechanism of fuzzy hashing/LSH and similarity comparison (hash distance). They clearly demonstrate the generation of hashes and their comparison for similarity detection. While they describe the technique underlying the "hash distance generation step" (Claim 1 and 9, and thus 10), and especially the LSH type algorithm of Claim 2, they apply this technique in different contexts (malware analysis) and do not disclose the specific collection of diverse context data elements, constituting a data packet from them (especially images as fixed-length strings of bits), and then applying the hash distance to authenticate the context as defined in US11387982. Thus, they do not anticipate the full scope of Claim 1, 8, or 10, but they demonstrate that the "generating a hash distance" and comparing it to a threshold (which is key to Claim 2) was known in the art for various forms of similarity detection.

Therefore, while these references teach individual components or similar concepts, none of them fully disclose every element of independent claims 1, 8, or 10 of US11387982 in a single piece of prior art, specifically the combination of (1) collecting diverse context data elements (including images as fixed-length strings of bits), (2) forming a data packet from them, (3) generating a hash from that packet, and (4) performing authentication based on a hash distance between the generated hash and a reference hash to allow for small changes. The specific "wherein" clauses of Claim 1 are particularly important in distinguishing US11387982 from prior art that uses hashing for different data types or purposes.

Full list of relevant prior art for US11387982:

1. US20040221153A1

   • Full Citation: US20040221153A1 - Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., "Apparatus and method of enciphering data packet of variable width"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2004-11-04; Priority: 2003-02-06
   • Brief Description: Describes methods and apparatus for enciphering data packets, including those with variable widths, primarily focusing on encryption techniques for data transmission.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate independent claims 1, 8, 9, or 10 due to lacking the core hash generation, hash distance comparison, and context-based authentication steps. It is relevant to the optional step of ciphering data packets, as described in dependent Claim 6 of US11387982.

2. US20060020796A1

   • Full Citation: US20060020796A1 - Microsoft Corporation, "Human input security codes"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2006-01-26; Priority: 2003-03-27
   • Brief Description: Describes generating human input security codes (e.g., CAPTCHAs) for distinguishing humans from automated processes, involving challenges and verification of human responses.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate any claims of US11387982 as it focuses on human interaction/CAPTCHA, not hash distance authentication from collected context data.

3. US20080181403A1

   • Full Citation: US20080181403A1 - Yu Sakamoto, "Authenticating system, authenticating method, and authenticating program"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2008-07-31; Priority: 2007-01-25
   • Brief Description: Describes an authentication system that receives authentication information, generates authentication data, compares it with registered authentication data, and authenticates. Authentication information can include user inputs or environmental data.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate independent claims 1, 8, 9, or 10. While it broadly discusses authentication and comparison, it lacks the specificity of generating a hash from a data packet of collected context data, using a hash distance (as opposed to a general comparison) for authentication, and the specific "wherein" clauses of Claim 1.

4. US20140108800A1

   • Full Citation: US20140108800A1 - David Lawrence, "System and method for improved geothentication based on a hash function"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2014-04-17; Priority: 2012-10-16
   • Brief Description: Describes a "geothentication" method where a hash function is applied to geolocation data to enhance security and privacy for location-based authentication.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate independent claims 1, 8, 9, or 10. While it involves hashing context data (geolocation), it does not disclose the generation of a hash distance between a generated hash and a reference hash for authentication, nor the specific "wherein" clauses of Claim 1 regarding a captured image as context data.

5. US20150096023A1

   • Full Citation: US20150096023A1 - Fireeye, Inc., "Fuzzy hash of behavioral results"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2015-04-02; Priority: 2013-09-30
   • Brief Description: Describes systems and methods for determining similarity between behavioral results (e.g., from malware analysis) using fuzzy hashing. This allows for similarity detection even with slight data variations.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate independent claims 1, 8, or 10, as it applies fuzzy hashing to "behavioral results" (e.g., malware) and lacks the specific context data collection (e.g., captured image as fixed-length string of bits) and explicit authentication of a context based on the hash distance. However, it is highly relevant to the "generating a hash distance" step and the use of fuzzy hash type algorithms, directly anticipating the technical principle of dependent Claim 2.

6. US9514753B2

   • Full Citation: US9514753B2 - Google Inc., "Speaker identification using hash-based indexing"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2016-12-06; Priority: 2013-11-04
   • Brief Description: Describes methods for identifying speakers using hash-based indexing, where audio data is processed, hashed, and compared to indexed hashes for identification.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate independent claims 1, 8, or 10. While it involves hashing biometric (audio) context data, it focuses on "speaker identification" using "hash-based indexing" which implies direct matching rather than a flexible "hash distance" for authentication that accounts for slight environmental changes, and it does not use a "captured image represented as a fixed-length string of bits" as the context data.

7. EP2924603A2

   • Full Citation: EP2924603A2 - Fmr Llc, "Method and system for user authentication based on biometrics, clothes wearing and surrounding scene"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2015-09-30; Priority: 2014-03-25
   • Brief Description: Describes a user authentication technique where a client sends a captured video signal (including user characteristics and environmental objects) to a server. The server analyzes the video signal to determine values, calculates a total score, and compares it to a reference score for authorization. US11387982 explicitly states this as prior art and describes its shortcomings (bandwidth, privacy).
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate independent claims 1, 8, or 10. While it relates to collecting context data and authenticating, it directly transmits the raw video signal and calculates a score from that raw data, rather than generating a hash, a hash distance between hashes, and authenticating based on that hash distance as claimed by US11387982.

8. WO2016083216A1

   • Full Citation: WO2016083216A1 - Gemalto Sa, "Method for accessing media data and corresponding device and system"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2016-06-02; Priority: 2014-11-28
   • Brief Description: Describes methods for accessing media data, potentially including authentication mechanisms. The title is general, suggesting access control for media rather than a specific context-based hash distance authentication.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate any claims of US11387982, as it does not disclose the specific steps of collecting context data for authentication, generating a hash from it, and using a hash distance for authentication.

9. US20170109514A1

   • Full Citation: US20170109514A1 - Sri International, "Continuous authentication of mobile device users"
   • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2017-04-20; Priority: 2014-12-18
   • Brief Description: Describes systems and methods for continuous authentication of mobile device users based on various user and device characteristics (context data) collected over time.
   • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate independent claims 1, 8, or 10. While it involves collecting context data for authentication, it does not explicitly disclose generating a hash from this data, computing a hash distance between generated and reference hashes, or authenticating based on that distance, nor the specific "wherein" clauses of Claim 1.

10. US9594906B1

    • Full Citation: US9594906B1 - Juniper Networks, Inc., "Confirming a malware infection on a client device using a remote access connection tool to identify a malicious file based on fuzzy hashes"
    • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2017-03-14; Priority: 2015-03-31
    • Brief Description: Describes confirming malware infections by calculating fuzzy hashes of files on a client device and comparing them to fuzzy hashes of known malicious files.
    • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate independent claims 1, 8, or 10. Similar to US20150096023A1, it uses fuzzy hashing for similarity detection, but in the context of malware files, not general context data (e.g., captured images) for user/environment authentication. It directly anticipates the technical principle of generating a hash distance (Claim 1, 9) and using fuzzy hash type algorithms for similarity (Claim 2).

11. US20160323243A1

    • Full Citation: US20160323243A1 - Cirius Messaging Inc., "Data leak protection system and processing methods thereof"
    • Publication/Filing Date: Publication: 2016-11-03; Priority: 2015-05-01
    • Brief Description: Describes systems and methods for data leak protection, often involving scanning and identifying sensitive information within data streams or files.
    • Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): Does not anticipate any claims of US11387982. It focuses on data leak protection, which is a different inventive concept from context-based authentication via hash distance.

US patent 11387982 describes a method, device, and system for authenticating a hash of a data packet derived from collected context data. The core of the invention lies in: collecting context data (specifically, a captured image represented as a fixed-length string of bits), forming a data packet, generating a hash using a predetermined hash type algorithm (such as a Locality Sensitive Hash (LSH) or fuzzy matching algorithm), sending this hash, and then generating a "hash distance" between the received hash and a predetermined reference hash to perform authentication.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, a patent claim is unpatentable if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art (POSA). The motivation to combine prior art references often arises from identified problems in existing solutions or from a known design choice to achieve predictable results.

Combination of Prior Art for Obviousness of US11387982 (Claim 1):

A strong argument for obviousness of US11387982, particularly Claim 1, can be made by combining:

1. EP 2 924 603 A2 (Fmr Llc): "Method and system for user authentication based on biometrics, clothes wearing and surrounding scene".
2. US20150096023A1 (Fireeye, Inc.): "Fuzzy hash of behavioral results".

Explanation of Obviousness:

1. Teachings of EP 2 924 603 A2:
EP 2 924 603 A2 discloses a user authentication technique where a client device transmits a captured video signal to a server. This video signal includes "physical user characteristic(s) and a physical object(s)/element(s) in the user environment". The server then analyzes this captured video signal to determine values associated with the visual and audio elements (environment characteristics), computes a total score, and compares this score to a predetermined reference score to decide whether to authorize the user.

The US11387982 patent itself identifies significant drawbacks of EP 2 924 603 A2: it "requires a big bandwidth, namely several Mb, for an upload of the captured video signal" and "the uploaded captured video signal includes information that discloses the user environment and therefore private data".

2. Teachings of US20150096023A1:
US20150096023A1 explicitly teaches the concept and application of "fuzzy hashes" for analyzing "behavioral results". Fuzzy hashing is a known technique where similar, but not identical, inputs produce similar hash values. This allows for detecting variations or similarities between data without requiring exact matches, and importantly, it generates a compact, obfuscated representation of the original data.

3. Motivation to Combine:
A person of ordinary skill in the art (POSA) would be directly motivated to combine the teachings of EP 2 924 603 A2 with those of US20150096023A1 to overcome the acknowledged problems of EP 2 924 603 A2. The patent US11387982 explicitly states the need for an "alternative authentication solution while being more efficient and more secure" than the one described in EP 2 924 603 A2.

The motivation for a POSA would be multifaceted:

• Address Bandwidth Issues: Replacing the transmission of large raw video signals (as in EP 2 924 603 A2) with a compact fuzzy hash (as taught by US20150096023A1) would drastically reduce bandwidth requirements, making the authentication process more efficient.
• Enhance Privacy: Sending a non-plaintext fuzzy hash instead of raw video data would prevent the disclosure of sensitive user environment details, thereby improving data privacy and security.
• Improve Robustness to Minor Variations: Context-based authentication, especially involving images or video, is inherently subject to minor, legitimate variations (e.g., lighting changes, slight object repositioning). Fuzzy hashing (as disclosed in US20150096023A1) is specifically designed to handle such variations, producing similar hashes for similar inputs. This property makes it ideal for enabling "resilience to more or less small changes" in the context, a benefit explicitly highlighted by US11387982.

4. How the Combination Renders Claim 1 Obvious:

Claim 1 of US11387982 comprises the following steps:

• "collecting, based on a predetermined authentication policy, at least one context data element;": EP 2 924 603 A2 teaches collecting a "captured video signal" containing user and environmental characteristics. An "image" is a common form of visual context data and a subset of video data; thus, collecting a captured image (represented as a fixed-length string of bits) as the context data element would be an obvious design choice for a POSA for authentication purposes.
• "constituting a data packet, based on the at least one collected context data element;": The video signal in EP 2 924 603 A2 is inherently constituted into a data packet for transmission. Similarly, a captured image (string of bits) would be formed into a data packet for processing and transmission.
• "generating a hash, by using a predetermined hash type algorithm and the data packet, as input to the predetermined hash type algorithm": Motivated by the bandwidth and privacy problems of EP 2 924 603 A2, a POSA would replace the transmission of raw data with a hash. US20150096023A1 teaches using "fuzzy hashes" for similarity detection. Applying a fuzzy hash algorithm (which are capable of handling varying input sizes like image data and producing fixed-length outputs suitable for comparison) to the image data packet from EP 2 924 603 A2 would be an obvious design choice. The patent US11387982 itself lists various fuzzy hashing algorithms (e.g., LSH, nilsimsa, sdhash, ssdeep) as examples for its "predetermined hash type algorithm," further indicating their known applicability for similarity-based hashing. The concept of a "hash is a byte stream generated from said string of bits representing said captured image" is fundamental to how hash functions operate on digital data.
• "sending the generated hash;": Instead of sending the raw, bandwidth-intensive video signal of EP 2 924 603 A2, the POSA, having generated a fuzzy hash, would send this compact, privacy-preserving hash. This directly solves the identified problems of EP 2 924 603 A2.
• "generating, as a hash distance generation step, a hash distance between the generated hash and a predetermined reference hash;": US20150096023A1 (fuzzy hashes) inherently supports the calculation of a "hash distance" or similarity score between two hash values to determine the similarity of their original inputs. EP 2 924 603 A2 already performs a comparison of a "total score" to a "predetermined reference score" for authentication, so substituting this with a fuzzy hash distance comparison is a logical adaptation.
• "authenticating successfully or not based on the generated hash distance, as an authentication": EP 2 924 603 A2 authenticates based on its score comparison. Authenticating based on a hash distance (e.g., comparing it to a threshold, as further detailed in Claim 2 of US11387982 and conceptually present in EP 2 924 603 A2's score comparison) is the natural outcome of using fuzzy hashes for similarity-based authentication.

Obviousness of Dependent Claims:
If Claim 1 is rendered obvious, then the dependent claims (2-7) also become obvious as they describe either well-known variations or optional features that a POSA would implement as design choices:

• Claim 2 (LSH, score, threshold): EP 2 924 603 A2 already compares a score to a threshold. LSH is a known type of fuzzy hash for generating similarity scores, and comparing such a score to a predetermined threshold for authentication is a standard application of these algorithms.
• Claims 3-6 (sorting, weighting, grouping, ciphering data packet): These are standard data preprocessing and security techniques common in digital data handling. Sorting, weighting, or grouping context data elements (Claim 3, 4, 5) are known methods to normalize data or prioritize certain aspects before hashing to achieve consistent or desired hash outputs. Ciphering the data packet (Claim 6) is a fundamental security practice.
• Claim 7 (HMAC key): Using a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) key derivation function for generating an encryption key is a standard cryptographic technique for secure key generation.

Obviousness of System/Device Claims:

• Claims 8, 9, and 10 define the first authentication device, second authentication device, and the authentication system, respectively. If the method itself (Claim 1) is deemed obvious, then the implementation of this method on generic computing hardware, such as a mobile phone (first device) and a remote server or secure element (second device), as described in US11387982, would also be obvious to a POSA. These claims simply recite the physical components configured to perform the obvious method steps.

In conclusion, the combination of EP 2 924 603 A2 and US20150096023A1, driven by the clear motivation to improve bandwidth efficiency, enhance privacy, and provide robustness to minor context changes, would render Claim 1 and its dependent claims of US11387982 obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.