US 8085192

Here's a concise summary of US patent 8085192:

US Patent 8085192: Summary

• Title: Device, system and method for controlling and storing sensitive information on a GPS device
• Assignee: Longhorn Automotive Group LLC (current assignee as of March 26, 2024); Rothschild Trust Holdings LLC (assigned April 4, 2012).
• Inventor: Leigh M. Rothschild
• Filing Date: April 5, 2010 (for application number US12/753,963)
• Issue Date: December 27, 2011
• Abstract: This patent describes a system and method designed to control and securely store sensitive information on a Global Positioning System (GPS) device. The system incorporates a module to determine location information, an encryption module to encrypt this data, a processing module to store the encrypted information in a storage module, and an input module for receiving a code string used for decryption. All data, whether manually entered or generated by the device, is encrypted and stored. The storage can be internal or removable memory (e.g., memory cards, optical media). If using internal memory, a transmission module (either wired or wireless) can transfer the information to a computer.

Plain-Language Overview of Independent Claims:

• Independent Claim 1: This claim describes a secure location information device comprising a housing, a locational information module for determining at least one route traveled by the device, an encryption module for encrypting this determined location information, and a removable storage module disposed within the housing for storing the encrypted data. A processing module is included to manage sending and retrieving the encrypted information from this removable storage module.
• Independent Claim 13: This claim describes a secure location information device, featuring a housing, a locational information module that determines at least one route traveled by the device, and an encryption module to encrypt this data. It includes a storage module (which can be either removable or internal) for storing the encrypted location information, and a processing module to send and retrieve the encrypted information from this storage module.
• Independent Claim 19: This claim outlines a system for controlling and storing location information. It combines the secure location information device as described in Claim 1 (with its removable storage module) and an external computing device. The computing device is equipped with a reader designed to accept the removable storage module, and a processor configured to execute a decryption program to unlock and access the encrypted location information stored on the removable module when it is inserted.
• Independent Claim 22: This claim also describes a system for controlling and storing location information. It includes a secure location information device (with a storage module) and a transmission module that sends the encrypted location information to an external computing device. The external computing device features a connectivity device to receive this encrypted data and a processor set up to run a decryption program to decrypt the received information.

Legal Status Note: According to the provided patent information, US8085192B2's legal status is "Expired - Lifetime", with an expiration date of October 7, 2025. As of April 26, 2026, the patent is expired.

Litigation/PTAB Note: The patent family has litigation history, including cases filed in the Texas Eastern District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (case 26-123). A PTAB case, IPR2025-00925, was filed but not instituted procedurally. No further specific CAFC 2026 docket details for this patent were found in the search results beyond what is listed in the Google Patents document.

Known litigation involving US patent 8085192 as of April 26, 2026:

1. PTAB Inter Partes Review Case

   • Plaintiff(s): Unified Patents
   • Defendant(s): Longhorn Automotive Group LLC (Inferred as the patent owner at the time of filing)
   • Jurisdiction: Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)
   • Case Number: IPR2025-00925
   • Filing Date: April 24, 2025
   • Outcome/Current Status: Not Instituted - Procedural

2. US District Court Case

   • Plaintiff(s): Longhorn Automotive Group LLC (Inferred as the patent owner, likely asserting infringement)
   • Defendant(s): Not explicitly stated in the provided record.
   • Jurisdiction: Texas Eastern District Court
   • Case Number: 2:26-cv-00235
   • Filing Date: 2026 (Implied by case number)
   • Outcome/Current Status: Filed (Ongoing)

3. US District Court Case

   • Plaintiff(s): Longhorn Automotive Group LLC (Inferred as the patent owner, likely asserting infringement)
   • Defendant(s): Not explicitly stated in the provided record.
   • Jurisdiction: Texas Eastern District Court
   • Case Number: 2:24-cv-00933
   • Filing Date: 2024 (Implied by case number)
   • Outcome/Current Status: Filed (Ongoing)

4. US District Court Case

   • Plaintiff(s): Longhorn Automotive Group LLC (Inferred as the patent owner, likely asserting infringement)
   • Defendant(s): Not explicitly stated in the provided record.
   • Jurisdiction: Texas Eastern District Court
   • Case Number: 2:24-cv-00603
   • Filing Date: 2024 (Implied by case number)
   • Outcome/Current Status: Filed (Ongoing)

5. US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Case

   • Plaintiff(s): Not explicitly stated (typically an appellant)
   • Defendant(s): Not explicitly stated (typically an appellee)
   • Jurisdiction: Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)
   • Case Number: 26-123
   • Filing Date: 2026 (Implied by case number)
   • Outcome/Current Status: Filed (Ongoing)

Proceedings overview

Only one AIA trial proceeding, IPR2025-00925, has been filed against US patent 8085192. This petition was denied institution on procedural grounds, specifically based on the USPTO Director's "settled expectations" rule, and a writ of mandamus has been filed at the Federal Circuit seeking review of this denial. As such, no claims have been invalidated or sustained on the merits. This means the patent has not been substantively challenged in an IPR, leaving all claims (1-22) intact.

IPR2025-00925 — Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. v. Longhorn Automotive Group LLC

• Type: Inter Partes Review
• Filed: 2025-04-24
• Status: Not Instituted - Procedural. The petition was denied institution by the USPTO Director based on discretionary grounds related to "settled expectations," rather than on the merits of the prior art arguments.
• Judge panel: The decision to deny institution was made under the Director's discretion. While no specific panel of Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) is publicly identified for the denial of institution for IPR2025-00925, the context of discretionary denials often involves the Acting Director, such as Coke Morgan Stewart, who issued similar decisions regarding "settled expectations."
• Petition grounds: The petition challenged all 22 claims of US8085192.
  • Ground 1: Obviousness over Fish (U.S. Patent 6,490,513) for claims 1-22. Petitioner argued that all claimed features are present in Fish, and a person of ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) would have understood that Fish's components and their functions meet the limitations of the challenged claims.
  • Ground 2: Obviousness over Fish (U.S. Patent 6,490,513) in view of Ziv (U.S. Patent Application Publication 2004/0103288) for claims 2-4 and 15-17. This ground targeted dependent claims relating to user authentication via a code string. Petitioner argued Fish's "operator interface 32" serves as the claimed input module for receiving a password for data deletion, and Ziv teaches portable storage with password-based on-the-fly encryption/decryption.
  • Ground 3: Obviousness over Fish (U.S. Patent 6,490,513), Ziv (U.S. Patent Application Publication 2004/0103288), and Gehlot (U.S. Patent 6,310,542) for claims 5-8 and 18. This ground challenged claims adding a biometric "identity capture device" to the user verification module, arguing that Ziv suggests biometrics as an alternative to passwords and Gehlot provides specific implementation details for biometric systems in a vehicle context.
• Institution decision: Denied on procedural grounds. The USPTO Director summarily denied the petition under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) based on the "settled expectations" rule, without providing a detailed explanation on the merits of the prior art arguments. The specific date of denial is not publicly available but occurred prior to the Federal Circuit mandamus petition filing on January 12, 2026.
• Final Written Decision: Not applicable, as institution was denied.
• Settlement / termination: Not settled; terminated by non-institution.
• Appeal: Yes. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus (Federal Circuit Case No. 26-123) challenging the USPTO's summary denial of the IPR petition. The appeal argues that the USPTO's "settled expectations" rule is irrational and that summary denial without explanation is illegal. The Respondent, Longhorn Automotive Group LLC, filed its opposition around February 4, 2026.
• Defensive value: The patent owner successfully avoided IPR institution, so the patent's claims remain untested on their merits. However, the petitioner's appeal to the Federal Circuit indicates the strength of the invalidity arguments may still be considerable, and the non-institution was purely procedural. For a defendant, this means the patent has not been "hardened" by surviving an IPR, but also that an IPR-based defense on the same grounds might face a similar procedural denial if the "settled expectations" doctrine continues to be applied or is upheld on appeal.

Strategic summary

Currently, all 22 claims of US8085192 are SUSTAINED in the sense that none have been challenged successfully through an AIA trial proceeding. The sole IPR petition, IPR2025-00925, challenged all claims (1-22) but was denied institution on procedural grounds by the USPTO Director, citing the "settled expectations" rule. This means the substantive patentability of the claims over the cited prior art (Fish, Ziv, Gehlot) has not been evaluated by the PTAB.

The estoppel landscape is complex due to the procedural denial. While 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) generally bars petitioners (and their privies) from raising grounds that were raised or reasonably could have been raised in an IPR that resulted in a final written decision, this IPR did not reach a final written decision. The "Not Instituted - Procedural" status suggests that the petitioner might not be estopped from challenging the patent in other forums on the same or related grounds, especially given the ongoing Federal Circuit appeal regarding the legality of the Director's denial. For a new defendant, the prior-art grounds raised by Volkswagen in IPR2025-00925 (obviousness over Fish, Fish+Ziv, and Fish+Ziv+Gehlot) are likely still available for an IPR filing, presuming they are not in privity with Volkswagen, and the Director's discretionary denial framework does not apply to them or is overturned on appeal.

There isn't a clear pattern of multiple IPRs on this patent. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. is the sole petitioner so far. The patent owner, Longhorn Automotive Group LLC, has actively defended the patent, including in the Federal Circuit appeal. The presence of Unified Patents in the search results indicates they track PTAB proceedings, but there's no direct evidence they filed this IPR or are acting as a defensive aggregator for this specific patent. The fact that the initial denial is being challenged at the Federal Circuit suggests aggressive pursuit by the petitioner to get a merits decision.

Recommended next steps

• Monitor the Federal Circuit appeal (Case No. 26-123, In re Volkswagen Group of America, Inc.). The outcome of this mandamus petition could significantly impact the viability of future IPR challenges against US8085192, particularly regarding the Director's discretion to deny institution based on "settled expectations." The Federal Circuit's decision could clarify the PTAB's discretionary denial policies.
• Since IPR2025-00925 was denied institution procedurally, there is no Final Written Decision to link to.
• No active proceedings are currently pending on the merits at the PTAB for US8085192. The absence of a merits-based PTAB review means the patent has not been subjected to the scrutiny of an IPR, which can be a signal that it has not been heavily asserted or that previous challenges have been deterred or dismissed.

Inventors

The sole named inventor is Leigh M. Rothschild. His employer at the time of filing for US12/753,963 (2010-04-05) is not explicitly stated, but the "Original Assignee" is listed as "Individual" on Google Patents, suggesting he was an independent inventor or held the rights personally at that time. The first recorded assignment shows him transferring his interest to Rothschild Trust Holdings, LLC, with an execution date significantly prior to the filing date of the application leading to this patent.

Original assignee

The original assignee, as indicated on the Google Patents page and supported by the initial assignment, was Leigh M. Rothschild, an individual inventor. It is unclear if Leigh M. Rothschild, as an individual, shipped a product directly embodying the claims. His primary line of business was invention. His current status is not relevant to the patent's ownership as he assigned his rights.

Assignment timeline

The following assignment records are based on the legal events listed on Google Patents for US8085192B2. Correspondent information is not available from this source.

• 2006-04-06 (executed) / recorded 2012-04-04 — Reel 027990/0854

  • Conveyance: Assignment
  • Assignor: ROTHSCHILD, LEIGH M.
  • Assignee: ROTHSCHILD TRUST HOLDINGS, LLC, FLORIDA
  • Correspondent: Not available from source.
  • Context: Transfer from individual inventor to an entity, likely for patent management or future assertion.

• 2012-03-22 (executed) / recorded 2012-04-04 — Reel 027990/0946

  • Conveyance: Assignment
  • Assignor: REAGAN INVENTIONS, L.L.C.
  • Assignee: FLAXEN HOLDINGS L.L.C., DELAWARE
  • Correspondent: Not available from source.
  • Context: Transfer between entities. (Note: A transfer from Rothschild Trust Holdings, LLC to Reagan Inventions, L.L.C. is not explicitly listed in the legal events for this patent but is implied by Reagan Inventions, L.L.C. being an assignor).

• 2015-08-26 (executed) / recorded 2016-01-20 — Reel 037535/0104

  • Conveyance: Merger
  • Assignor: FLAXEN HOLDINGS L.L.C.
  • Assignee: XENOGENIC DEVELOPMENT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, D
  • Correspondent: Not available from source.
  • Context: Merger of entities, typically a corporate restructuring.

• 2023-09-25 (executed) / recorded 2023-09-25 — Reel 065015/0773

  • Conveyance: Assignment
  • Assignor: XENOGENIC DEVELOPMENT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
  • Assignee: INTELLECTUAL VENTURES ASSETS 190 LLC, DELAWARE
  • Correspondent: Not available from source.
  • Context: Transfer to a known patent aggregator/assertion entity.

• 2023-10-05 (executed) / recorded 2023-10-13 — Reel 065227/0107

  • Conveyance: Assignment
  • Assignor: INTELLECTUAL VENTURES ASSETS 190 LLC
  • Assignee: AI-CORE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC, TEXAS
  • Correspondent: Not available from source.
  • Context: Transfer from a known aggregator to another entity, likely a shell for specific assertion campaigns.

• 2023-10-06 (executed) / recorded 2024-03-26 — Reel 066911/0261

  • Conveyance: Assignment
  • Assignor: AI-CORE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC
  • Assignee: LONGHORN AUTOMOTIVE GROUP LLC, TEXAS
  • Correspondent: Not available from source.
  • Context: Transfer between entities, likely another shell for assertion, occurring just before new litigation.

Timeline diagram

timeline
    title Ownership of US 8085192
    2006 : Inventor to Rothschild Trust Holdings LLC
    2012 : Reagan Inventions to Flaxen Holdings LLC
    2015 : Flaxen Holdings merged to Xenogenic Dev LLC
    2023 : Xenogenic Dev LLC to Intellectual Ventures
         : IV to AI-CORE Technologies LLC
    2024 : AI-CORE Technologies to Longhorn Auto Group LLC

NPE / troll-pattern signals

1. Shell-entity transfer — present
   The chain begins with a transfer from the individual inventor Leigh M. Rothschild to Rothschild Trust Holdings, LLC (executed 2006-04-06 / recorded 2012-04-04, Reel 027990/0854). Subsequent transfers involve entities with generic LLC names, such as AI-CORE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC (executed 2023-10-05 / recorded 2023-10-13, Reel 065227/0107) and LONGHORN AUTOMOTIVE GROUP LLC (executed 2023-10-06 / recorded 2024-03-26, Reel 066911/0261), which are common characteristics of shell entities used for patent assertion.

2. Known asserter in the chain — present
   INTELLECTUAL VENTURES ASSETS 190 LLC, a widely recognized patent assertion entity, appears as an assignee (executed 2023-09-25 / recorded 2023-09-25, Reel 065015/0773). The initial inventor, Leigh M. Rothschild, is also known for his involvement with numerous patent holding companies.

3. Repeat correspondent across the chain — unclear
   Correspondent information is not available from the Google Patents legal events section, which is the primary source used for this analysis. Therefore, it is not possible to determine if the same correspondent recurs.

4. Cascading transfers — present
   There is a clear pattern of rapid, consecutive transfers in late 2023 and early 2024:

   • XENOGENIC DEVELOPMENT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY to INTELLECTUAL VENTURES ASSETS 190 LLC (executed 2023-09-25)
   • INTELLECTUAL VENTURES ASSETS 190 LLC to AI-CORE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC (executed 2023-10-05)
   • AI-CORE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC to LONGHORN AUTOMOTIVE GROUP LLC (executed 2023-10-06)
     These three assignments were executed within an 12-day period, followed by recording of the final assignment a few months later. This swift succession of transfers through different entities is a strong indicator of an NPE pattern.

5. Pre-litigation transfer — present
   The patent was assigned to AI-CORE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC on 2023-10-05 (execution date) and then to LONGHORN AUTOMOTIVE GROUP LLC on 2023-10-06 (execution date). Subsequently, US litigation cases, such as 2:24-cv-00933, were filed in the Texas Eastern District Court in 2024, naming Longhorn Automotive Group LLC as the plaintiff. This timing, where assignments occur within months of patent assertion, is a strong signal of pre-litigation transfer to establish a specific plaintiff entity.

6. Bankruptcy fire-sale — not present
   There is no information in the provided patent text or legal events to suggest any assignee in the chain filed for bankruptcy leading to the patent transfer.

7. Privateering — unclear
   While the chain indicates NPE activity, there is no direct evidence from the provided sources to confirm that the current assignee is asserting patents on behalf of a specific operating company against its competitors (privateering).

8. Defensive aggregator (anti-NPE) — not present
   The current assignee is Longhorn Automotive Group LLC, which is not a known defensive aggregator. Intellectual Ventures, an earlier assignee, is an assertion entity, not a defensive aggregator.

Verdict

NPE — high confidence

The ownership chain for US8085192 exhibits multiple strong signals indicative of a Non-Practicing Entity (NPE). These include the involvement of a known patent assertion entity, Intellectual Ventures Assets 190 LLC (executed 2023-09-25, Reel 065015/0773), a series of rapid cascading transfers through shell-like entities (executed between 2023-09-25 and 2023-10-06), and a clear pre-litigation transfer to Longhorn Automotive Group LLC immediately preceding the filing of infringement lawsuits in 2024.

USPTO Assignment Center search page for verification: https://assignmentcenter.uspto.gov/patents/8085192

Here is an analysis of the most relevant prior art for US Patent 8085192, based on the citations provided within the patent text:

The independent claims of US8085192 B2 focus on a location information device with secure data storage, involving:

• Determining location information (at least a route traveled)
• Encrypting this determined location information
• Storing the encrypted information in a storage module (removable or internal)
• A processing module for handling the storage and retrieval of this encrypted information
• Systems that involve an external computing device with a reader or connectivity to decrypt this information
• User input of a code string or user verification (e.g., biometric) for decryption/access

The following prior art references are identified as most relevant:

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1. US20040010699A1

• Full Citation: US20040010699A1 - "Secure data management techniques" by Zhimin Shao.
• Publication/Filing Date: Published: 2004-01-15 (Priority date: 2002-02-07).
• Brief Description: This patent application discloses general methods and systems for secure data management, including encrypting data for storage and transmission to prevent unauthorized access.
• Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This reference broadly anticipates the concept of encrypting and storing data for security, which is a fundamental component of US8085192's independent claims (Claims 1, 13, 19, 22) regarding an "encryption module for encrypting the determined location information" and "storing the encrypted location information in a storage module." However, it does not specifically teach the application to location information on a GPS device with the detailed user-controlled decryption mechanisms (e.g., code string, external computer decryption) explicitly claimed in US8085192. It potentially anticipates the general notion of data encryption and secure storage, but likely not the full combination of elements in any independent claim.

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2. US20060204047A1

• Full Citation: US20060204047A1 - "Portable memory storage device with biometric identification security" by Sanjay Dave.
• Publication/Filing Date: Published: 2006-09-14 (Priority date: 2005-03-09).
• Brief Description: This patent application describes a portable memory storage device (e.g., a USB drive) that incorporates biometric identification security to control access to the stored data.
• Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This reference is highly relevant to US8085192's dependent claims 3-10, which introduce a "user verification module for verifying the identity of user of the device." Specifically, Claim 5 details an "identity capture device," and Claims 6-10 specify various biometric devices (retinal scanner, fingerprint reader, facial recognition reader, DNA detection device). Dave's patent, with its priority date preceding US8085192, directly teaches the use of biometric identification for securing a portable storage device. If the storage module of the GPS device in US8085192 is considered a portable memory storage device in this context, then the biometric access control aspects of Claims 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of US8085192 could be anticipated.

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3. US7117075B1

• Full Citation: US7117075B1 - "Driver activity and vehicle operation logging and reporting" by Report On Board Llc.
• Publication/Filing Date: Published: 2006-10-03 (Priority date: 2005-08-15).
• Brief Description: This patent details a system for logging and reporting driver activity and vehicle operation, which includes collecting and storing GPS data such as vehicle location and speed.
• Potential Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102): This reference is relevant to the initial elements of US8085192's independent claims (Claims 1, 13, 19, 22) concerning the determination and storage of location information. It explicitly teaches a "locational information module for determining location information of the device" where the "determined location information being at least one route traveled by the device" and includes "velocity of the device at predetermined times" (Claim 11). The patent describes storing this sensitive vehicle usage information. However, it lacks the explicit teaching of an "encryption module for encrypting the determined location information" on the device for user-controlled access via a code string or an external decryption program, which are central inventive features of US8085192. It thus provides a strong foundation for the data collection and storage aspects of US8085192 but would likely not fully anticipate the encryption and secure access control features.

Obviousness Analysis of US Patent 8085192 under 35 U.S.C. § 103

This analysis identifies combinations of prior art references that would render the claims of US Patent 8085192 obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art (POSITA) at the time of the invention (priority date: September 6, 2005). The analysis utilizes the prior art identified in the "Prior art" section:

1. US7117075B1 (Report On Board Llc): "Driver activity and vehicle operation logging and reporting" (Published: 2006-10-03; Priority: 2005-08-15).
2. US20040010699A1 (Zhimin Shao): "Secure data management techniques" (Published: 2004-01-15; Priority: 2002-02-07).
3. US20060204047A1 (Sanjay Dave): "Portable memory storage device with biometric identification security" (Published: 2006-09-14; Priority: 2005-03-09).

Combination I: Report On Board (US7117075B1) + Shao (US20040010699A1)

This combination renders independent Claims 1, 13, 19, and 22, along with dependent Claims 2, 11, 12, 14, 15, 20, and 21, obvious.

Motivation for Combination:
Report On Board discloses a device for "logging and reporting driver activity and vehicle operation," which involves determining and storing sensitive location information, such as routes traveled and vehicle velocity. The background of US8085192 explicitly identifies the sensitivity of such information (e.g., home addresses, routes, vehicle usage by employees or children) and the need to restrict access to "designated parties." [Description, Background, para 3-4] Shao teaches general "secure data management techniques," including "encrypting data for storage and transmission to prevent unauthorized access." A person of ordinary skill in the art, facing the recognized problem of securing sensitive location data collected by a device like that in Report On Board, would have been highly motivated to apply the well-known solution of data encryption, as taught by Shao, to protect this information from unauthorized access. This combination directly addresses the stated need for secure storage of sensitive GPS data.

Application to Independent Claims:

• Claims 1 & 13 (Device Claims):

  • Report On Board provides a device with a housing, a locational information module for determining location information (including at least one route traveled and velocity), and a storage module for this information.
  • Shao teaches an "encryption module for encrypting" data and storing "encrypted location information" in a storage module to prevent unauthorized access.
  • Combining these, it would be obvious to integrate Shao's encryption module into Report On Board's device to encrypt the sensitive location data before storing it in the device's storage module, with a processing module inherently handling the sending and retrieving of this encrypted data.
  • For Claim 1, which specifies a "removable storage module," the background of US8085192 itself states that "most devices will allow a user to store information such as address points in the internal memory of the device. Some devices will allow you to store this information on removable memory, e.g., memory cards, optical media, etc." [Description, Background, para 2]. Given that removable memory was a common feature of GPS devices for data transfer, it would have been obvious to apply Shao's encryption to such a removable storage module within the Report On Board device.
  • Thus, independent Claims 1 and 13 are rendered obvious.

• Claims 19 & 22 (System Claims):

  • Claim 19 (Removable Storage System): Building on the obvious device of Claim 1, Report On Board's system is for "logging and reporting," implying that the stored data is eventually accessed and analyzed. When data is stored on a removable module, it is a routine and obvious practice to transfer this module to an external computing device equipped with a compatible reader. Shao's teaching of encryption inherently necessitates a corresponding decryption mechanism. Therefore, it would be obvious to provide an external computing device with a reader for the removable storage module and a processor configured to execute a decryption program to access the encrypted data for reporting and analysis.
  • Claim 22 (Transmission Module System): Building on the obvious device of Claim 13, Report On Board's "reporting" function also implies data transmission. Shao explicitly teaches "encrypting data for storage and transmission." It would be obvious to equip the combined device with a transmission module (e.g., hardwired or wireless, as commonly found on electronic devices and described in US8085192's description of module 112) to transmit the encrypted data to an external computing device. The external computing device would similarly be equipped with a connectivity device for receiving the data and a processor to execute a decryption program, an inherent component of any encryption scheme.
  • Thus, independent Claims 19 and 22 are rendered obvious.

Application to Dependent Claims:

• Claims 2 & 15 (Code String Input): The use of a "code string" (e.g., a password) for encrypting and decrypting data is a fundamental and well-known aspect of secure data management, as generally taught by Shao. An input module to receive such a code string is a standard feature of interactive electronic devices. It would be obvious to integrate such a standard security input method into the device of the combination.
• Claims 11 & 20 (Specific Location Information): Report On Board explicitly teaches logging "velocity of a vehicle." The background of US8085192 states that GPS devices commonly store "home address" and "destination addresses." [Description, Background, para 3] These are common and sensitive types of location information that a POSITA would find obvious to protect using the encryption scheme of the combination.
• Claims 12 & 14 (Transmission Module): These claims are inherently addressed by the analysis for independent Claim 22, as a transmission module is a common and obvious means for transferring data from a device to an external computer for reporting and analysis.
• Claim 21 (Mapping Program Overlay): Once the location information is decrypted and available on an external computing device, it is a routine and obvious function of mapping software (which was widely available prior to the priority date) to "overlay the location information on at least one of the plurality of geographical maps" for visualization and analysis. This is a common post-processing step for geographic data.

Combination II: Report On Board (US7117075B1) + Shao (US20040010699A1) + Dave (US20060204047A1)

This combination renders dependent Claims 3-10 and 16-18 obvious.

Motivation for Combination:
Building upon Combination I, which provides a device that collects and stores encrypted sensitive location data, a POSITA would be motivated to further enhance the security and user access control for this sensitive information. Dave teaches a "portable memory storage device with biometric identification security" to control access to stored data. Given the increasing need for robust authentication in devices handling sensitive information, and the widespread knowledge of biometric technology for identity verification (as acknowledged in US8085192's detailed description for UVM 130, which explicitly mentions "retinal scanning device, finger print reader, facial recognition reader"), it would be obvious to integrate biometric user verification, as taught by Dave, into the encrypted location information device. [Description, Detailed Description, para 22] This would provide a more secure and/or convenient method of access compared to merely using a code string, aligning with the goal of restricting access to "designated parties."

Application to Dependent Claims:

• Claims 3 & 16 (User Verification Module): Dave's patent directly teaches a "biometric identification security" system for a portable memory device, which functions as a user verification module for controlling access to stored data based on user identity. Applying this concept to the device of Combination I to verify the identity of a user and selectively decrypt location information would be obvious.
• Claims 4 & 17 (Password Protection Algorithm): Password protection algorithms were conventional means of user verification prior to the priority date, and could be implemented as an alternative or supplementary method to biometrics.
• Claims 5 & 18 (Identity Capture Device): Dave's biometric identification system inherently includes an "identity capture device."
• Claims 6-10 (Specific Biometric Devices): Dave refers to "biometric identification," which encompasses various known specific biometric devices. The specific examples listed in Claims 7-10 (retinal scanning, fingerprint reader, facial recognition, DNA detection) were all known or contemplated biometric technologies prior to the priority date. It would be obvious for a POSITA to select any known biometric device for the identity capture device based on application requirements (e.g., security level, user convenience).
• Thus, dependent Claims 3-10 and 16-18 are rendered obvious by the combination of Report On Board, Shao, and Dave.

US Patent 8085192, titled "Device, system and method for controlling and storing sensitive information on a GPS device," was filed as application number US12/753,963 on April 5, 2010, and published on December 27, 2011. The patent's priority date is September 6, 2005.

Continuation Applications:
US Patent 8085192 is explicitly identified as a continuation application of U.S. patent application Ser. No. 11/220,233, which was filed on September 6, 2005 (later issued as US7692580B2).

Divisional Applications:
The provided patent text does not explicitly list any divisional applications.

Related Family Members:
The patent family includes the following related applications:

• US11/220,233 (US7692580B2): The parent continuation application, filed on September 6, 2005.
• US13/326,214 (US20120089324A1): This is listed as a continuation application and a child application of the same priority date (September 6, 2005), filed on December 14, 2011, and is currently abandoned.

Patent Term Adjustments (PTA) / Patent Term Extensions (PTE):
While specific values for Patent Term Adjustments (PTA) or Patent Term Extensions (PTE) are not explicitly detailed in the provided text, the patent's adjusted expiration date of October 7, 2025, accounts for any such adjustments.

Projected Expiration Date:
The projected expiration date for US Patent 8085192 was October 7, 2025. As of the current date (April 26, 2026), the patent has already expired.

Defensive Disclosure: Derivatives of US Patent 8085192

This document describes derivative works based on US Patent 8085192, "Device, system and method for controlling and storing sensitive information on a GPS device," with the intent of establishing prior art for incremental improvements and rendering them obvious or non-novel. The derivatives explore alternative implementations, operational contexts, and integrations with advanced technologies, ensuring comprehensive coverage of potential future innovations.

Core Claim Analysis and Derivatives

The core inventive concepts of US Patent 8085192, particularly in Claims 1, 13, 19, and 22, revolve around securely storing encrypted location information on a device and enabling its decryption, either directly on the device or via a connected computing system. The derivatives below build upon these foundational claims.

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Derivatives for Claim 1 (Location information device with secure data storage, removable module)

Claim 1 Summary: A location information device with a housing, a locational information module determining route-traveled location information, an encryption module, a removable storage module for encrypted location information, and a processing module for sending/retrieving to/from the removable storage module.

Derivative 1.1: Material & Component Substitution (Solid-State Encrypted Cartridge)

Enabling Description: This derivative employs a tamper-resistant, physically robust solid-state storage cartridge, such as a UFS (Universal Flash Storage) or NVMe (Non-Volatile Memory Express) module, within a hardened polymer-ceramic composite housing. The locational information module integrates a multi-constellation GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) receiver (e.g., GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou) with a MEMS (Micro-Electro-Mechanical System) inertial measurement unit (IMU) for enhanced accuracy and dead reckoning. The encryption module utilizes a dedicated hardware security module (HSM) implementing AES-256 GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) encryption with ephemeral session keys derived via a D-H (Diffie-Hellman) key exchange protocol with a trusted platform module (TPM) on the host processor. The removable storage module is engineered with a proprietary connector featuring electrical and mechanical keying to prevent unauthorized insertion or data extraction without the specific device interface. Data transfer to and from the storage is performed over a high-speed serial bus (e.g., PCIe Gen4) to minimize latency.

graph TD
    A[Housing (Polymer-Ceramic Composite)] --> B(GNSS + MEMS IMU Module);
    B --> C{Processing Module};
    C --> D[Hardware Security Module (HSM) - AES-256 GCM];
    D -- Encrypted Location Data --> E[Removable Solid-State Cartridge (UFS/NVMe)];
    E -- Proprietary Connector --> A;
    C -- Control/Key Exchange --> D;
    C -- Data I/O --> E;
    D -- Key Management --> F(Trusted Platform Module - TPM);

Derivative 1.2: Operational Parameter Expansion (Extreme Environment Data Logger)

Enabling Description: This variant is designed for persistent operation in extreme environments, such as deep-sea submersibles or high-altitude atmospheric probes. The device housing is constructed from Grade 5 Titanium alloy, rated for pressures up to 10,000 psi and temperatures from -80°C to +150°C. The locational information module incorporates an ultra-low power, shielded GNSS receiver and an acoustically-coupled underwater positioning system (e.g., USBL - Ultra-Short Baseline). The encryption module is hardened against radiation effects and temperature fluctuations, employing elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for key generation and AES-256-XTS for data encryption, writing directly to a radiation-hardened MRAM (Magnetoresistive RAM) removable storage module. Data logging occurs at a configurable rate, from sub-second (e.g., 100 Hz for high-dynamic tracking) to daily intervals, with event-triggered bursts at increased frequencies. The processing module includes robust error-correction codes (ECC) for data integrity and a watchdog timer for autonomous recovery in critical conditions.

graph TD
    A[Titanium Housing (-80C to +150C, 10000psi)] --> B(Hardened GNSS/USBL Module);
    B --> C{Hardened Processing Module};
    C --> D[Radiation-Hardened ECC Encryption (AES-256-XTS)];
    D -- Encrypted Event Data --> E[Radiation-Hardened Removable MRAM Cartridge];
    C -- Control/Data Flow --> D;
    C -- Data Logging Rates --> F(Configurable Logging Scheduler);
    F -- Triggered Events --> C;

Derivative 1.3: Cross-Domain Application (Medical Device Tracking)

Enabling Description: In the medical domain, this device could track portable, sensitive medical equipment (e.g., organ transport coolers, specialized diagnostic tools). The housing is biocompatible and sterile, fabricated from medical-grade PEEK (Polyetheretherketone). The locational information module combines indoor positioning (e.g., BLE beacon triangulation, UWB) with external GNSS for seamless indoor-outdoor tracking. The encryption module enforces HIPAA-compliant data security, utilizing FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules and hardware-backed key storage. The "location information" includes not only physical coordinates but also environmental parameters (temperature, humidity from integrated sensors) and timestamps, all securely encrypted. The removable storage module is a single-use, sterilized, write-once-read-many (WORM) solid-state memory card, preventing data alteration or accidental deletion. The processing module logs access attempts and verification failures, providing an audit trail.

flowchart TD
    A[Biocompatible PEEK Housing] --> B(Indoor (BLE/UWB) & GNSS Locational Module);
    B -- Location & Env. Data --> C{Processing Module (Audit Trail)};
    C -- Data + Metadata --> D[FIPS 140-2 Crypto Module (AES-256)];
    D -- Encrypted Data --> E[Single-Use WORM Storage Card];
    E -- Removable --> F(Medical Device Interface);
    B -- Env. Sensors (Temp/Humidity) --> C;

Derivative 1.4: Integration with Emerging Tech (IoT-Edge Analytics & Secure Ledger)

Enabling Description: This derivative integrates with IoT-edge analytics and blockchain for enhanced security and data integrity. The device acts as an IoT edge node. The locational information module streams raw GNSS and IMU data to a local processing unit where an embedded AI model performs real-time anomaly detection on movement patterns (e.g., unexpected stops, route deviations). This filtered and enriched location data, along with model inferences, is encrypted using a hardware root-of-trust, then cryptographically signed. The removable storage module acts as a temporary, signed data cache. Upon network connectivity, a transmission module forwards batches of signed, encrypted data to an IoT gateway. This data is then hashed and anchored to a private blockchain ledger at regular intervals, providing an immutable record of location events and AI insights. Decryption keys are managed via a distributed key management system (DKMS) accessible only to authorized entities through multi-factor authentication.

graph TD
    A[Housing] --> B(GNSS/IMU Locational Module);
    B -- Raw Data Stream --> C{Edge Processing Unit (AI Anomaly Detection)};
    C -- Filtered/Enriched Data --> D[Hardware Root-of-Trust (Encryption + Digital Signature)];
    D -- Signed, Encrypted Data --> E[Removable Data Cache Module];
    E -- Batches --> F(Transmission Module);
    F -- Network --> G(IoT Gateway);
    G -- Hashed Data --> H(Private Blockchain Ledger);
    H -- Immutability --> I(Auditor/Regulator);
    J(DKMS) -- Decryption Keys --> K(Authorized Decryption Service);
    K -- Access Control --> L(MFA User);
    D -- Key Requests --> J;

Derivative 1.5: The "Inverse" or Failure Mode (Low-Power Sentinel Mode)

Enabling Description: This derivative features a "Low-Power Sentinel Mode" for extended operational life under critical power constraints or during periods of inactivity, while maintaining basic security and location awareness. In this mode, the locational information module operates intermittently (e.g., 1-minute fixes every 10 minutes) using a simplified, lower-precision GNSS acquisition routine and minimal processing. The encryption module switches to a lightweight, energy-efficient cipher (e.g., SPECK or ChaCha20) for encrypting only critical state changes or positional "waypoints," rather than continuous route data. The removable storage module's controller enters a deep sleep state between write operations. The device maintains a minimal "heartbeat" signal, occasionally transmitting encrypted status updates via a low-bandwidth, low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) module (e.g., LoRaWAN, NB-IoT). If an unauthorized removal of the storage module is detected (e.g., via a Hall effect sensor on the interlock), the device instantly purges any active decryption keys from volatile memory and switches to an "alert" state, transmitting a distress signal with its last known encrypted location.

stateDiagram-v2
    state NormalOperatingMode {
        direction LR
        NM_Active: Active GNSS, Full AES-256, Continuous Logging
        NM_Inactive: Standby, Encrypted Data @ Rest
        NM_Active --> NM_Inactive : User Inactivity
        NM_Inactive --> NM_Active : User Activation
    }

    state LowPowerSentinelMode {
        direction LR
        LPSM_Intermittent: Intermittent GNSS, Lightweight Cipher, Waypoint Logging
        LPSM_Alert: Distress Signal, Key Purge, Last Encrypted Location
        LPSM_Intermittent --> LPSM_Alert : Unauthorized Removal Detected
        LPSM_Intermittent --> LPSM_Intermittent : Scheduled Updates
    }

    [*] --> NormalOperatingMode : Power On
    NormalOperatingMode --> LowPowerSentinelMode : Low Battery / User Selects Low Power
    LowPowerSentinelMode --> NormalOperatingMode : Power Restored / User Selects Normal

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Derivatives for Claim 13 (Location information device with secure data storage, general storage module)

Claim 13 Summary: A location information device with a housing, a locational information module determining route-traveled location information, an encryption module, a storage module for encrypted location information, and a processing module for sending/retrieving to/from the storage module.

Derivative 13.1: Material & Component Substitution (Non-Volatile Holographic Storage)

Enabling Description: This derivative utilizes a non-volatile holographic storage module for high-density, long-term archival of encrypted location data. The housing incorporates advanced thermal management features for the laser-based storage system. The locational information module is a high-precision RTK (Real-Time Kinematic) GNSS system for sub-meter accuracy. The encryption module implements quantum-safe cryptography algorithms (e.g., CRYSTALS-Kyber for key exchange and CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures) to protect against future quantum computing attacks. The processing module manages data buffering and sequential writing to the holographic media, including error correction coding adapted for volumetric storage. The holographic storage, while not "removable" in the traditional sense, can be "swapped" in specialized service depots via proprietary optical interface and robotics.

graph TD
    A[Housing (Advanced Thermal Management)] --> B(RTK GNSS Locational Module);
    B -- Sub-meter Location Data --> C{Processing Module (Buffering, ECC)};
    C --> D[Quantum-Safe Cryptography Module];
    D -- Encrypted Data --> E[Non-Volatile Holographic Storage Module];
    C -- Control Flow --> D;
    E -- Specialized Interface --> F(Service Depot for Archival/Swapping);

Derivative 13.2: Operational Parameter Expansion (High-Frequency Micro-Tracking)

Enabling Description: Designed for micro-tracking applications (e.g., drone swarm coordination, micro-robotics), this device operates at extremely high data rates and granularities. The locational information module consists of an array of miniaturized UWB (Ultra-Wideband) transceivers for precise relative positioning within a local swarm, supplemented by a high-refresh-rate GNSS receiver for absolute positioning. Data logging occurs at rates up to 1 kHz, capturing fine-grained motion profiles. The encryption module leverages hardware-accelerated stream ciphers (e.g., Poly1305-AES) for minimal overhead on high-frequency data streams. The storage module is a high-endurance, high-speed embedded eMMC (embedded MultiMediaCard) or UFS, specifically designed for continuous, rapid write cycles. The processing module implements real-time compression algorithms (e.g., Zstd) to manage the volume of encrypted data before storage.

flowchart TD
    A[Micro-Device Housing] --> B(Miniaturized UWB/High-Refresh GNSS Array);
    B -- 1 kHz Positional Data --> C{Processing Module (Real-time Compression)};
    C --> D[Hardware-Accelerated Stream Cipher (Poly1305-AES)];
    D -- Encrypted, Compressed Data --> E[High-Endurance eMMC/UFS Storage];
    C -- Control Flow --> D;

Derivative 13.3: Cross-Domain Application (Smart City Infrastructure Monitoring)

Enabling Description: Applied to smart city infrastructure, devices are embedded in bridges, roads, or utility poles. The "location information" extends beyond the device's own position to include structural integrity data (vibration, strain from integrated sensors) or environmental quality data (air pollution, noise levels) captured at its fixed or semi-fixed location. The locational information module is a fixed GNSS receiver with long-term stability monitoring capabilities. The encryption module uses public-key infrastructure (PKI) for secure data signing and encryption, ensuring data authenticity and confidentiality for municipal authorities. The storage module is a robust industrial-grade NAND flash memory, designed for extended operational life in outdoor conditions, with built-in wear-leveling and bad block management. The processing module continuously aggregates and encrypts sensor data, associating it with precise timestamps and verifiable device identity.

classDiagram
    class SmartCityDevice {
        + Housing
        + GNSS_Receiver : Fixed
        + Environmental_Sensors
        + Structural_Sensors
        + PKI_Encryption_Module
        + Industrial_NAND_Storage
        + Processing_Module : Data Aggregation, Timestamping, Identity
    }
    class PKI_Encryption_Module {
        + Encrypt(data)
        + Sign(data)
    }
    class Processing_Module {
        + AggregateSensorData()
        + EncryptAndStore()
    }
    SmartCityDevice --> GNSS_Receiver
    SmartCityDevice --> Environmental_Sensors
    SmartCityDevice --> Structural_Sensors
    SmartCityDevice --> PKI_Encryption_Module
    SmartCityDevice --> Industrial_NAND_Storage
    SmartCityDevice --> Processing_Module

Derivative 13.4: Integration with Emerging Tech (Federated Learning for Anomaly Detection)

Enabling Description: This derivative integrates federated learning for privacy-preserving anomaly detection and IoT sensors. The device's locational information module (e.g., GNSS, Wi-Fi triangulation) records movement patterns. The processing module, on the edge, runs a local AI model for anomaly detection based on these patterns, but instead of sending raw data, it periodically sends model updates (e.g., weight adjustments) to a central server, never the raw encrypted location data. Before transmission, these model updates are encrypted using homomorphic encryption (or secure multi-party computation) by the encryption module. The storage module holds encrypted raw location data locally and encrypted model updates before transmission. This allows a central federated learning server to aggregate insights across many devices without ever seeing sensitive location information in plaintext, thereby enhancing privacy while detecting global anomalous patterns. A blockchain can verify the integrity of model updates.

sequenceDiagram
    participant D as Device
    participant L as Locational Module
    participant P as Processing (Edge AI)
    participant E as Encryption (Homomorphic)
    participant S as Storage
    participant T as Transmission
    participant G as Central Federated Learning Server
    participant B as Blockchain

    L->>P: Raw Location Data
    P->>P: Train Local Anomaly Detection Model
    P->>E: Model Updates
    E->>T: Encrypted Model Updates (Homomorphic)
    T->>G: Encrypted Model Updates
    G->>G: Aggregate Updates (Federated Learning)
    G->>B: Hash of Aggregated Model Updates
    Note over P, S: Raw Location Data is also encrypted by E and stored in S for local access.
    T->>S: Store Encrypted Model Updates before transmission

Derivative 13.5: The "Inverse" or Failure Mode (Privacy-Centric Data Purge)

Enabling Description: This derivative prioritizes user privacy and fails by securely purging sensitive data under specific conditions. The device features a user-configurable "privacy-zone" geofence. If the device remains within a designated privacy zone (e.g., home, office) for a prolonged period, or if it detects unauthorized access attempts (e.g., multiple failed biometric scans, removal from an authorized cradle), the encryption module triggers a cryptographic erase of the sensitive location information stored in the storage module. This erase is performed by overwriting the encryption keys with random data, rendering the stored ciphertext irrecoverable. The locational information module also ceases logging when within a privacy zone or upon detection of a critical privacy breach event. A limited "black box" mode retains only non-identifying aggregate movement statistics (e.g., total distance traveled per day) encrypted with a separate, publicly auditable key.

stateDiagram-v2
    state NormalOperating {
        NM_Logging: Log and Encrypt Location
    }
    state PrivacyZoneDetected {
        PZD_Monitoring: Monitor Time in Zone
        PZD_StopLogging: Cease Logging Sensitive Data
    }
    state UnauthorizedAccessAttempt {
        UAA_Count: Count Failed Attempts
        UAA_TriggerPurge: Trigger Cryptographic Erase
    }
    state DataPurged {
        DP_Irrecoverable: Keys Overwritten
        DP_BlackBox: Aggregate Stats Only
    }

    [*] --> NormalOperating
    NormalOperating --> PrivacyZoneDetected : Enter Privacy Zone
    PrivacyZoneDetected --> NormalOperating : Exit Privacy Zone
    NormalOperating --> UnauthorizedAccessAttempt : Failed Access Attempt
    UnauthorizedAccessAttempt --> DataPurged : Max Attempts / Critical Breach
    PrivacyZoneDetected --> DataPurged : Prolonged Stay in Zone (Configured Threshold)
    DataPurged --> [*] : Device Reset / User Re-initiate

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Derivatives for Claim 19 (System with removable storage and reader)

Claim 19 Summary: A system including a location information device (with removable storage as in Claim 1) and a computing device with a reader configured to read and a processor configured to execute a decryption program for decrypting the encrypted location information from the removable storage module.

Derivative 19.1: Material & Component Substitution (Bio-Authentication Key Module)

Enabling Description: This system replaces the generic "code string" input with a multi-factor biometric authentication process integrated into the removable storage module itself. The removable storage module (e.g., a secure element microSD card) incorporates a dedicated System-on-Chip (SoC) with a fingerprint sensor and a secure enclave. The device records location data and encrypts it using keys derived from a unique biometric hash. To decrypt, the computing device's reader is replaced by a specialized docking station that interfaces with the secure element microSD card. The user must provide a live fingerprint scan to the secure element's integrated sensor. The SoC verifies the biometric data and, if authenticated, releases the decryption keys within its secure enclave to the computing device's processor for on-the-fly decryption, without ever exposing the raw keys to the main computing device. The docking station itself has a hardened enclosure (e.g., carbon fiber reinforced polymer) to prevent physical tampering.

graph TD
    A[Location Device Housing] --> B(Locational Module);
    B --> C(Encryption Module);
    C -- Encrypted Location Data --> D[Removable Secure-Element MicroSD Card];
    D -- Integrated Fingerprint Sensor + Secure Enclave SoC --> D_Sub;
    A --> D;
    D -- Physical Interface --> E[Specialized Docking Station (Hardened Housing)];
    E --> F(Computing Device Processor);
    F -- Executes Decryption Program --> G(User Interface for Decrypted Data);
    D_Sub -- Biometric Verification --> F;

Derivative 19.2: Operational Parameter Expansion (Global Scale Fleet Management)

Enabling Description: This system manages a global fleet of autonomous vehicles (e.g., long-haul trucks, cargo ships). The location information device on each vehicle logs data at sub-meter precision (RTK-GNSS) every second, along with vehicle telemetry (engine diagnostics, fuel consumption, driver behavior metrics). The removable storage module is an industrial-grade, hot-swappable solid-state drive (SSD) with a minimum 10 TB capacity, designed for millions of write cycles and extreme temperature resilience. At designated fleet depots worldwide, the SSDs are automatically ejected and inserted into high-speed computing clusters acting as "readers." These clusters utilize massively parallel processing (e.g., GPU acceleration) to decrypt petabytes of encrypted telemetry and location data, allowing real-time analytics of fleet performance, route optimization, and predictive maintenance across the entire global operation.

flowchart TD
    A[Autonomous Vehicle] --> B(RTK-GNSS Module);
    B -- Location + Telemetry (1Hz) --> C(Encryption Module);
    C -- Encrypted Data --> D[Hot-Swappable 10TB Industrial SSD];
    D -- Automated Ejection/Insertion --> E[Global Fleet Depot (High-Speed Computing Cluster)];
    E -- Massively Parallel Decryption --> F(Fleet Management Analytics Platform);
    F --> G(Route Optimization / Predictive Maintenance);

Derivative 19.3: Cross-Domain Application (Geological Survey & Environmental Monitoring)

Enabling Description: In geological surveys, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or ground robots carry the devices. The "location information" includes precise geological coordinates, multispectral imagery timestamps, seismic sensor data, and soil sample location tags. The device's removable storage module is a ruggedized, high-capacity industrial SD card. The computing device is a field-deployable rugged laptop or tablet equipped with a multi-card reader. The decryption program on the computing device integrates with GIS (Geographic Information System) software (e.g., QGIS open-source) to automatically overlay decrypted survey data onto geographical maps, cross-referencing with existing geological databases. The system allows field geologists to rapidly decrypt, visualize, and validate data on-site, enhancing survey efficiency and accuracy.

graph LR
    A[UAV/Ground Robot] --> B(Locational Module + Sensors);
    B -- Encrypted Survey Data --> C[Ruggedized Removable SD Card];
    C -- Card Reader --> D[Field-Deployable Rugged Laptop];
    D -- Decryption Program + QGIS --> E(Geospatial Data Visualization);
    E -- Comparison --> F(Existing Geological Databases);

Derivative 19.4: Integration with Emerging Tech (Decentralized Identity & Smart Contracts)

Enabling Description: This system leverages decentralized identity (DID) and smart contracts for access control and verifiable data ownership. The "code string" for decryption is replaced by a digital credential issued as a verifiable attestation stored on a user's decentralized identity wallet. When a removable storage module is inserted into the computing device's reader, the decryption program initiates a challenge-response protocol. The user's DID wallet must present the appropriate verifiable credential, cryptographically signed by an authorized issuer (e.g., the device manufacturer, or a regulatory body). This credential, once verified, triggers a smart contract on a blockchain, which then releases a temporary, one-time decryption key to the computing device. This ensures that only owners with verifiable identity and permissions can decrypt data, and the access event is immutably recorded on the blockchain. The removable storage module itself contains a secure element for hardware-backed DID key storage.

sequenceDiagram
    participant D as Location Device
    participant R as Removable Storage Module
    participant C as Computing Device (Reader + Processor)
    participant U as User (DID Wallet)
    participant S as Smart Contract (Blockchain)
    participant I as Issuer (Verifiable Credential)

    D->>R: Store Encrypted Location Data
    U->>C: Insert R, Initiate Decryption
    C->>U: Challenge for Verifiable Credential
    U->>I: Request Credential (if not already held)
    I->>U: Issue Signed Verifiable Credential
    U->>C: Present Verifiable Credential
    C->>S: Verify Credential and Request Decryption Key
    S->>C: Release Temporary Decryption Key
    C->>R: Decrypt Data from R
    C->>U: Display Decrypted Information
    S->>S: Log Access Event on Blockchain

Derivative 19.5: The "Inverse" or Failure Mode (Tamper-Evident Data Obfuscation)

Enabling Description: This system focuses on making data access highly detectable upon unauthorized removal or tampering. If the removable storage module's integrity is compromised (e.g., through physical stress detected by embedded strain gauges, or an unauthorized insertion into a non-approved reader detected by voltage anomalies), the encryption module triggers a deliberate, but reversible, data obfuscation layer on top of the existing encryption. This could involve scrambling sector allocation tables, injecting false header information, or modifying timestamps, making it appear as if the data is corrupted or unusable, even if eventually decrypted. The authorized decryption program on the computing device has the specific algorithm to undo this obfuscation layer before attempting standard decryption. The detection of tampering or unauthorized access is also logged immutably within a secure immutable log on the storage module itself, serving as forensic evidence.

stateDiagram-v2
    state NormalOperation {
        NO_Encrypted: Data is Encrypted
    }
    state TamperingDetected {
        TD_Physical: Strain Gauge Triggered
        TD_Electrical: Voltage Anomaly (Unauthorized Reader)
        TD_ImmutableLog: Log Tamper Event
    }
    state DataObfuscated {
        DO_Scrambled: Sector Tables Scrambled
        DO_FalseHeaders: False Data Headers Injected
        DO_ModifiedTimestamps: Timestamps Modified
    }

    [*] --> NormalOperation
    NormalOperation --> TamperingDetected : Physical Tampering / Unauthorized Access
    TamperingDetected --> DataObfuscated : Trigger Obfuscation Layer
    DataObfuscated --> DecryptionProcess : Authorized Computing Device (Undoes Obfuscation)
    DecryptionProcess --> [*] : Decrypted Data

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Derivatives for Claim 22 (System with general storage and transmission module)

Claim 22 Summary: A system including a location information device (with a general storage module and a transmission module) and an external computing device with a connectivity device for receiving, and a processor for executing a decryption program for the encrypted location information.

Derivative 22.1: Material & Component Substitution (Photonic Integrated Circuit for Secure Transmission)

Enabling Description: This system replaces traditional RF/electrical transmission with secure, high-bandwidth optical communication. The location information device's transmission module is a PIC (Photonic Integrated Circuit) transponder, converting encrypted location data into modulated light signals. The external computing device integrates a PIC receiver for optical data input. The housing of both the device and the external computing device's connectivity module are designed with optical ports and alignment mechanisms. Data is encrypted using quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols established over a free-space optical link or fiber optic cable, generating session keys for AES-256 GCM encryption of location data. This provides unconditional security for data in transit. The storage module is a high-speed SLC NAND flash for data buffering before optical transmission.

graph TD
    A[Location Device Housing] --> B(Locational Module);
    B --> C(Encryption Module - AES-256 GCM);
    C -- Encrypted Data --> D[SLC NAND Buffer];
    D -- Data --> E[PIC Transponder (Optical Transmission)];
    E -- Optical Link (QKD-Secured) --> F[PIC Receiver (External Computing Device)];
    F --> G(External Computing Device Processor);
    G -- Decryption Program --> H(Decrypted Location Info);
    QKD(Quantum Key Distribution) -- Session Keys --> C;

Derivative 22.2: Operational Parameter Expansion (Deep Space Probe Data Relay)

Enabling Description: This system is for transmitting encrypted telemetry and positional data from deep-space probes. The "location information" includes the probe's trajectory, attitude (orientation), and sensor readings from distant cosmic phenomena. The device's locational module uses an optical navigation system (star trackers) and an onboard IMU for precise positioning relative to celestial bodies. The transmission module is a high-gain directional antenna operating in the Ka-band, communicating with Earth-based deep space networks (DSN). Data is encrypted with long-period symmetric-key algorithms (e.g., Threefish-1024) and interleaved with Reed-Solomon error correction codes for resilience against long-distance transmission errors and cosmic ray interference. The external computing device is a DSN ground station, equipped with specialized signal processing hardware and algorithms to extract and decrypt the weak, highly attenuated signals. The storage module on the probe is radiation-hardened PCM (Phase-Change Memory) for non-volatile, high-endurance storage.

flowchart TD
    A[Deep Space Probe (Radiation-Hardened)] --> B(Optical Nav/IMU Locational Module);
    B -- Trajectory/Telemetry --> C(Threefish-1024 Encryption + Reed-Solomon ECC);
    C -- Encrypted Data --> D[Radiation-Hardened PCM Storage];
    D -- Buffered Data --> E[High-Gain Ka-band Antenna];
    E -- Deep Space Link --> F[DSN Ground Station (Specialized Receiver)];
    F --> G(External Computing Device - Decryption + Signal Processing);
    G --> H(Mission Control & Analysis);

Derivative 22.3: Cross-Domain Application (Smart Agriculture Field Monitoring)

Enabling Description: This system monitors agricultural machinery (e.g., autonomous tractors, drones for crop spraying) and environmental conditions across vast farmlands. The "location information" includes the precise coordinates of farming operations (e.g., seeding, spraying routes), soil moisture levels from attached sensors, and crop health metrics (e.g., NDVI from spectral cameras). The device is ruggedized for outdoor farm use. Its transmission module utilizes a long-range LoRaWAN radio for low-power, wide-area communication across miles of fields to a central farm hub (the external computing device). The encryption module uses AES-128 for lightweight, secure transmission. The storage module is an industrial-grade eMMC. The external computing device (farm hub) aggregates data, decrypts it, and feeds it into an agricultural management software platform to optimize irrigation, fertilization, and pest control strategies across the farm.

graph TD
    A[Autonomous Tractor/Drone (Ruggedized)] --> B(GNSS + Soil/Crop Sensors);
    B -- Location + Sensor Data --> C(AES-128 Encryption Module);
    C -- Encrypted Data --> D[Industrial eMMC Storage];
    D -- Buffered Data --> E[LoRaWAN Transmission Module];
    E -- Long-Range Radio Link --> F[Farm Hub (External Computing Device)];
    F --> G(Decryption + Farm Management Software);
    G --> H(Optimal Farming Strategies);

Derivative 22.4: Integration with Emerging Tech (AI-Driven Threat Intelligence & Secure Cloud Storage)

Enabling Description: This system transmits encrypted location data for analysis by an AI-driven threat intelligence platform and stores it in secure cloud storage. The device includes a locational information module (e.g., assisted GNSS, cellular triangulation) that continuously logs movements. The processing module employs a local AI model for detecting suspicious patterns (e.g., loitering in restricted areas, unexpected deviations from approved routes). The encryption module encrypts all raw and AI-inferred data using FIPS 140-3 validated encryption, with keys rotated frequently and managed by a Hardware Security Module (HSM). The transmission module uses a secure cellular link (e.g., 5G with IPSec VPN) to stream encrypted data to a cloud-based external computing platform. This platform uses a federated AI model to analyze aggregated encrypted data (without decrypting individual records) for global threat patterns. Only authorized security analysts with multi-factor authentication can access specific decrypted records through a zero-trust architecture. All data transfers and decryption requests are logged on a transparent, immutable permissioned blockchain for auditability.

sequenceDiagram
    participant D as Location Device
    participant L as Locational Module
    participant P as Processing (Edge AI)
    participant E as Encryption (FIPS 140-3 HSM)
    participant S as Storage
    participant T as Transmission (5G IPSec)
    participant C as Cloud Computing Platform (External)
    participant A as AI Threat Intelligence Platform
    participant B as Permissioned Blockchain
    participant U as Authorized Security Analyst

    L->>P: Raw Location Data
    P->>P: Local AI Anomaly Detection
    P->>E: Raw Data + AI Inferences
    E->>S: Encrypted Data (for buffer)
    S->>T: Encrypted Data Stream
    T->>C: Secure Transmission
    C->>A: Encrypted Data (for federated analysis)
    A->>C: Federated AI Insights
    U->>C: MFA Decryption Request (Zero-Trust)
    C->>E: Request Key (via HSM)
    E->>C: Transmit Key
    C->>U: Decrypted Data (specific records)
    C->>B: Log All Data Transfers & Decryption Requests

Derivative 22.5: The "Inverse" or Failure Mode (Privacy-Preserving Telemetry Relay)

Enabling Description: This derivative focuses on protecting privacy during failure or distress by transforming sensitive location data into anonymized, aggregate telemetry. In a "privacy-preserving telemetry mode" (activated by user, system fault, or geofence), the locational information module drastically reduces the precision and frequency of location fixes (e.g., bounding box coordinates rather than exact points, 1-hour intervals). The processing module aggregates these imprecise coordinates into "heatmaps" or statistical representations of general movement patterns. The encryption module applies homomorphic encryption to these aggregated statistics, so that the external computing device can perform analysis on the encrypted data without decrypting individual (even imprecise) location points. The transmission module then sends these homomorphically encrypted aggregate statistics. Critical alerts (e.g., SOS signal) may include a single, time-limited, precise encrypted location, but only if explicit user consent or a pre-defined emergency protocol is triggered. The storage module maintains only the homomorphically encrypted aggregates.

stateDiagram-v2
    state NormalOperation {
        NO_PreciseLogging: Full Precision, Frequent Logging
        NO_FullEncryption: Full AES Encryption
    }
    state PrivacyTelemetryMode {
        PTM_ReducedPrecision: Bounding Box / Low Frequency
        PTM_AggregateData: Generate Heatmaps / Stats
        PTM_HomomorphicEncryption: Encrypt Aggregates
        PTM_Transmit: Send Encrypted Aggregates
    }
    state EmergencyAlert {
        EA_ConsentRequired: User Consent for Precise
        EA_TimeLimitedKey: Key for Single Precise Location
    }

    [*] --> NormalOperation
    NormalOperation --> PrivacyTelemetryMode : User Activates / System Fault / Geofence
    PrivacyTelemetryMode --> EmergencyAlert : User Triggers SOS
    EmergencyAlert --> NormalOperation : Emergency Resolved
    PrivacyTelemetryMode --> NormalOperation : Deactivate PTM

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Combination Prior Art Scenarios with Open-Source Standards

These scenarios combine elements of US Patent 8085192 with existing open-source standards, demonstrating how the core inventive concepts can be implemented using publicly available technologies and specifications.

1. OpenStreetMap (OSM) & OGC Standards for Secure Geo-Tagged Data:

   • Description: A device implementing Claim 13 (general storage and encryption) stores encrypted location information, including routes and points of interest. This encrypted data also includes metadata tagged with OpenStreetMap (OSM) object IDs or categories. When transferred to an external computing device, the decryption program integrates with open-source GIS libraries (e.g., GDAL/OGR, PostGIS) that can consume and render OSM data. Decrypted location information (e.g., GPX tracks, GeoJSON points) is then spatially joined with OSM layers or styled according to Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) standards (e.g., WKT, WKB, GML) for display and analysis. The device itself could utilize a stripped-down Linux kernel (e.g., OpenWRT) and open-source GNSS middleware (e.g., RTKLIB) for its locational module.
   • Relevance: This demonstrates the secure storage and decryption of location data, then its immediate integration and visualization with widely accepted, open-source geospatial standards and data, making further "improvements" in map integration obvious.

2. MQTT and TLS/SSL for Secure IoT Location Data Transmission:

   • Description: A system based on Claim 22 (general storage and transmission) utilizes the MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) protocol, an OASIS standard for IoT messaging, to transmit encrypted location data from the device to an external computing device (acting as an MQTT broker). The transmission module uses TLS/SSL (Transport Layer Security/Secure Sockets Layer), an open standard for cryptographic protocols, to secure the MQTT connection, ensuring end-to-end encryption of the data channel. The device's encryption module performs the payload encryption, and the external computing device's decryption program then processes the received, authenticated, and decrypted MQTT messages. The device might run an embedded OS like FreeRTOS or Zephyr with open-source MQTT client libraries.
   • Relevance: This establishes prior art for using standard, open-source IoT communication protocols and security layers for transmitting encrypted location information, covering a broad range of networked device applications.

3. Keycloak/OAuth2 for User Authentication and Data Access Control:

   • Description: For devices incorporating user verification (e.g., Claims 3, 16), the system integrates with Keycloak (an open-source identity and access management solution) using the OAuth2 (Open Authorization 2.0) framework. When a user attempts to access or decrypt sensitive location information (either on the device with a code string, or via an external computing device), the system delegates authentication to a Keycloak server. The device or the external computing application acts as an OAuth2 client, redirecting the user for authentication (e.g., username/password, MFA) against Keycloak. Upon successful authentication, Keycloak issues an access token. This token, containing claims about the user's identity and permissions, is then used by the device's processing module or the external computing device's decryption program to authorize access to decryption keys or the encrypted data.
   • Relevance: This shows how standard, open-source identity and access management solutions can be seamlessly integrated with the patent's core concept of controlled access to encrypted location data, making claims around user verification and decryption based on identity obvious.