Patent 8085192

Derivative works

Defensive disclosure: derivative variations of each claim designed to render future incremental improvements obvious or non-novel.

Active provider: Google · gemini-2.5-flash

Derivative works

Defensive disclosure: derivative variations of each claim designed to render future incremental improvements obvious or non-novel.

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Defensive Disclosure: Derivatives of US Patent 8085192

This document describes derivative works based on US Patent 8085192, "Device, system and method for controlling and storing sensitive information on a GPS device," with the intent of establishing prior art for incremental improvements and rendering them obvious or non-novel. The derivatives explore alternative implementations, operational contexts, and integrations with advanced technologies, ensuring comprehensive coverage of potential future innovations.

Core Claim Analysis and Derivatives

The core inventive concepts of US Patent 8085192, particularly in Claims 1, 13, 19, and 22, revolve around securely storing encrypted location information on a device and enabling its decryption, either directly on the device or via a connected computing system. The derivatives below build upon these foundational claims.

Derivatives for Claim 1 (Location information device with secure data storage, removable module)

Claim 1 Summary: A location information device with a housing, a locational information module determining route-traveled location information, an encryption module, a removable storage module for encrypted location information, and a processing module for sending/retrieving to/from the removable storage module.

Derivative 1.1: Material & Component Substitution (Solid-State Encrypted Cartridge)

Enabling Description: This derivative employs a tamper-resistant, physically robust solid-state storage cartridge, such as a UFS (Universal Flash Storage) or NVMe (Non-Volatile Memory Express) module, within a hardened polymer-ceramic composite housing. The locational information module integrates a multi-constellation GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) receiver (e.g., GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou) with a MEMS (Micro-Electro-Mechanical System) inertial measurement unit (IMU) for enhanced accuracy and dead reckoning. The encryption module utilizes a dedicated hardware security module (HSM) implementing AES-256 GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) encryption with ephemeral session keys derived via a D-H (Diffie-Hellman) key exchange protocol with a trusted platform module (TPM) on the host processor. The removable storage module is engineered with a proprietary connector featuring electrical and mechanical keying to prevent unauthorized insertion or data extraction without the specific device interface. Data transfer to and from the storage is performed over a high-speed serial bus (e.g., PCIe Gen4) to minimize latency.

graph TD
    A[Housing (Polymer-Ceramic Composite)] --> B(GNSS + MEMS IMU Module);
    B --> C{Processing Module};
    C --> D[Hardware Security Module (HSM) - AES-256 GCM];
    D -- Encrypted Location Data --> E[Removable Solid-State Cartridge (UFS/NVMe)];
    E -- Proprietary Connector --> A;
    C -- Control/Key Exchange --> D;
    C -- Data I/O --> E;
    D -- Key Management --> F(Trusted Platform Module - TPM);

Derivative 1.2: Operational Parameter Expansion (Extreme Environment Data Logger)

Enabling Description: This variant is designed for persistent operation in extreme environments, such as deep-sea submersibles or high-altitude atmospheric probes. The device housing is constructed from Grade 5 Titanium alloy, rated for pressures up to 10,000 psi and temperatures from -80°C to +150°C. The locational information module incorporates an ultra-low power, shielded GNSS receiver and an acoustically-coupled underwater positioning system (e.g., USBL - Ultra-Short Baseline). The encryption module is hardened against radiation effects and temperature fluctuations, employing elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for key generation and AES-256-XTS for data encryption, writing directly to a radiation-hardened MRAM (Magnetoresistive RAM) removable storage module. Data logging occurs at a configurable rate, from sub-second (e.g., 100 Hz for high-dynamic tracking) to daily intervals, with event-triggered bursts at increased frequencies. The processing module includes robust error-correction codes (ECC) for data integrity and a watchdog timer for autonomous recovery in critical conditions.

graph TD
    A[Titanium Housing (-80C to +150C, 10000psi)] --> B(Hardened GNSS/USBL Module);
    B --> C{Hardened Processing Module};
    C --> D[Radiation-Hardened ECC Encryption (AES-256-XTS)];
    D -- Encrypted Event Data --> E[Radiation-Hardened Removable MRAM Cartridge];
    C -- Control/Data Flow --> D;
    C -- Data Logging Rates --> F(Configurable Logging Scheduler);
    F -- Triggered Events --> C;

Derivative 1.3: Cross-Domain Application (Medical Device Tracking)

Enabling Description: In the medical domain, this device could track portable, sensitive medical equipment (e.g., organ transport coolers, specialized diagnostic tools). The housing is biocompatible and sterile, fabricated from medical-grade PEEK (Polyetheretherketone). The locational information module combines indoor positioning (e.g., BLE beacon triangulation, UWB) with external GNSS for seamless indoor-outdoor tracking. The encryption module enforces HIPAA-compliant data security, utilizing FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules and hardware-backed key storage. The "location information" includes not only physical coordinates but also environmental parameters (temperature, humidity from integrated sensors) and timestamps, all securely encrypted. The removable storage module is a single-use, sterilized, write-once-read-many (WORM) solid-state memory card, preventing data alteration or accidental deletion. The processing module logs access attempts and verification failures, providing an audit trail.

flowchart TD
    A[Biocompatible PEEK Housing] --> B(Indoor (BLE/UWB) & GNSS Locational Module);
    B -- Location & Env. Data --> C{Processing Module (Audit Trail)};
    C -- Data + Metadata --> D[FIPS 140-2 Crypto Module (AES-256)];
    D -- Encrypted Data --> E[Single-Use WORM Storage Card];
    E -- Removable --> F(Medical Device Interface);
    B -- Env. Sensors (Temp/Humidity) --> C;

Derivative 1.4: Integration with Emerging Tech (IoT-Edge Analytics & Secure Ledger)

Enabling Description: This derivative integrates with IoT-edge analytics and blockchain for enhanced security and data integrity. The device acts as an IoT edge node. The locational information module streams raw GNSS and IMU data to a local processing unit where an embedded AI model performs real-time anomaly detection on movement patterns (e.g., unexpected stops, route deviations). This filtered and enriched location data, along with model inferences, is encrypted using a hardware root-of-trust, then cryptographically signed. The removable storage module acts as a temporary, signed data cache. Upon network connectivity, a transmission module forwards batches of signed, encrypted data to an IoT gateway. This data is then hashed and anchored to a private blockchain ledger at regular intervals, providing an immutable record of location events and AI insights. Decryption keys are managed via a distributed key management system (DKMS) accessible only to authorized entities through multi-factor authentication.

graph TD
    A[Housing] --> B(GNSS/IMU Locational Module);
    B -- Raw Data Stream --> C{Edge Processing Unit (AI Anomaly Detection)};
    C -- Filtered/Enriched Data --> D[Hardware Root-of-Trust (Encryption + Digital Signature)];
    D -- Signed, Encrypted Data --> E[Removable Data Cache Module];
    E -- Batches --> F(Transmission Module);
    F -- Network --> G(IoT Gateway);
    G -- Hashed Data --> H(Private Blockchain Ledger);
    H -- Immutability --> I(Auditor/Regulator);
    J(DKMS) -- Decryption Keys --> K(Authorized Decryption Service);
    K -- Access Control --> L(MFA User);
    D -- Key Requests --> J;

Derivative 1.5: The "Inverse" or Failure Mode (Low-Power Sentinel Mode)

Enabling Description: This derivative features a "Low-Power Sentinel Mode" for extended operational life under critical power constraints or during periods of inactivity, while maintaining basic security and location awareness. In this mode, the locational information module operates intermittently (e.g., 1-minute fixes every 10 minutes) using a simplified, lower-precision GNSS acquisition routine and minimal processing. The encryption module switches to a lightweight, energy-efficient cipher (e.g., SPECK or ChaCha20) for encrypting only critical state changes or positional "waypoints," rather than continuous route data. The removable storage module's controller enters a deep sleep state between write operations. The device maintains a minimal "heartbeat" signal, occasionally transmitting encrypted status updates via a low-bandwidth, low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) module (e.g., LoRaWAN, NB-IoT). If an unauthorized removal of the storage module is detected (e.g., via a Hall effect sensor on the interlock), the device instantly purges any active decryption keys from volatile memory and switches to an "alert" state, transmitting a distress signal with its last known encrypted location.

stateDiagram-v2
    state NormalOperatingMode {
        direction LR
        NM_Active: Active GNSS, Full AES-256, Continuous Logging
        NM_Inactive: Standby, Encrypted Data @ Rest
        NM_Active --> NM_Inactive : User Inactivity
        NM_Inactive --> NM_Active : User Activation
    }

    state LowPowerSentinelMode {
        direction LR
        LPSM_Intermittent: Intermittent GNSS, Lightweight Cipher, Waypoint Logging
        LPSM_Alert: Distress Signal, Key Purge, Last Encrypted Location
        LPSM_Intermittent --> LPSM_Alert : Unauthorized Removal Detected
        LPSM_Intermittent --> LPSM_Intermittent : Scheduled Updates
    }

    [*] --> NormalOperatingMode : Power On
    NormalOperatingMode --> LowPowerSentinelMode : Low Battery / User Selects Low Power
    LowPowerSentinelMode --> NormalOperatingMode : Power Restored / User Selects Normal

Derivatives for Claim 13 (Location information device with secure data storage, general storage module)

Claim 13 Summary: A location information device with a housing, a locational information module determining route-traveled location information, an encryption module, a storage module for encrypted location information, and a processing module for sending/retrieving to/from the storage module.

Derivative 13.1: Material & Component Substitution (Non-Volatile Holographic Storage)

Enabling Description: This derivative utilizes a non-volatile holographic storage module for high-density, long-term archival of encrypted location data. The housing incorporates advanced thermal management features for the laser-based storage system. The locational information module is a high-precision RTK (Real-Time Kinematic) GNSS system for sub-meter accuracy. The encryption module implements quantum-safe cryptography algorithms (e.g., CRYSTALS-Kyber for key exchange and CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures) to protect against future quantum computing attacks. The processing module manages data buffering and sequential writing to the holographic media, including error correction coding adapted for volumetric storage. The holographic storage, while not "removable" in the traditional sense, can be "swapped" in specialized service depots via proprietary optical interface and robotics.

graph TD
    A[Housing (Advanced Thermal Management)] --> B(RTK GNSS Locational Module);
    B -- Sub-meter Location Data --> C{Processing Module (Buffering, ECC)};
    C --> D[Quantum-Safe Cryptography Module];
    D -- Encrypted Data --> E[Non-Volatile Holographic Storage Module];
    C -- Control Flow --> D;
    E -- Specialized Interface --> F(Service Depot for Archival/Swapping);

Derivative 13.2: Operational Parameter Expansion (High-Frequency Micro-Tracking)

Enabling Description: Designed for micro-tracking applications (e.g., drone swarm coordination, micro-robotics), this device operates at extremely high data rates and granularities. The locational information module consists of an array of miniaturized UWB (Ultra-Wideband) transceivers for precise relative positioning within a local swarm, supplemented by a high-refresh-rate GNSS receiver for absolute positioning. Data logging occurs at rates up to 1 kHz, capturing fine-grained motion profiles. The encryption module leverages hardware-accelerated stream ciphers (e.g., Poly1305-AES) for minimal overhead on high-frequency data streams. The storage module is a high-endurance, high-speed embedded eMMC (embedded MultiMediaCard) or UFS, specifically designed for continuous, rapid write cycles. The processing module implements real-time compression algorithms (e.g., Zstd) to manage the volume of encrypted data before storage.

flowchart TD
    A[Micro-Device Housing] --> B(Miniaturized UWB/High-Refresh GNSS Array);
    B -- 1 kHz Positional Data --> C{Processing Module (Real-time Compression)};
    C --> D[Hardware-Accelerated Stream Cipher (Poly1305-AES)];
    D -- Encrypted, Compressed Data --> E[High-Endurance eMMC/UFS Storage];
    C -- Control Flow --> D;

Derivative 13.3: Cross-Domain Application (Smart City Infrastructure Monitoring)

Enabling Description: Applied to smart city infrastructure, devices are embedded in bridges, roads, or utility poles. The "location information" extends beyond the device's own position to include structural integrity data (vibration, strain from integrated sensors) or environmental quality data (air pollution, noise levels) captured at its fixed or semi-fixed location. The locational information module is a fixed GNSS receiver with long-term stability monitoring capabilities. The encryption module uses public-key infrastructure (PKI) for secure data signing and encryption, ensuring data authenticity and confidentiality for municipal authorities. The storage module is a robust industrial-grade NAND flash memory, designed for extended operational life in outdoor conditions, with built-in wear-leveling and bad block management. The processing module continuously aggregates and encrypts sensor data, associating it with precise timestamps and verifiable device identity.

classDiagram
    class SmartCityDevice {
        + Housing
        + GNSS_Receiver : Fixed
        + Environmental_Sensors
        + Structural_Sensors
        + PKI_Encryption_Module
        + Industrial_NAND_Storage
        + Processing_Module : Data Aggregation, Timestamping, Identity
    }
    class PKI_Encryption_Module {
        + Encrypt(data)
        + Sign(data)
    }
    class Processing_Module {
        + AggregateSensorData()
        + EncryptAndStore()
    }
    SmartCityDevice --> GNSS_Receiver
    SmartCityDevice --> Environmental_Sensors
    SmartCityDevice --> Structural_Sensors
    SmartCityDevice --> PKI_Encryption_Module
    SmartCityDevice --> Industrial_NAND_Storage
    SmartCityDevice --> Processing_Module

Derivative 13.4: Integration with Emerging Tech (Federated Learning for Anomaly Detection)

Enabling Description: This derivative integrates federated learning for privacy-preserving anomaly detection and IoT sensors. The device's locational information module (e.g., GNSS, Wi-Fi triangulation) records movement patterns. The processing module, on the edge, runs a local AI model for anomaly detection based on these patterns, but instead of sending raw data, it periodically sends model updates (e.g., weight adjustments) to a central server, never the raw encrypted location data. Before transmission, these model updates are encrypted using homomorphic encryption (or secure multi-party computation) by the encryption module. The storage module holds encrypted raw location data locally and encrypted model updates before transmission. This allows a central federated learning server to aggregate insights across many devices without ever seeing sensitive location information in plaintext, thereby enhancing privacy while detecting global anomalous patterns. A blockchain can verify the integrity of model updates.

sequenceDiagram
    participant D as Device
    participant L as Locational Module
    participant P as Processing (Edge AI)
    participant E as Encryption (Homomorphic)
    participant S as Storage
    participant T as Transmission
    participant G as Central Federated Learning Server
    participant B as Blockchain

    L->>P: Raw Location Data
    P->>P: Train Local Anomaly Detection Model
    P->>E: Model Updates
    E->>T: Encrypted Model Updates (Homomorphic)
    T->>G: Encrypted Model Updates
    G->>G: Aggregate Updates (Federated Learning)
    G->>B: Hash of Aggregated Model Updates
    Note over P, S: Raw Location Data is also encrypted by E and stored in S for local access.
    T->>S: Store Encrypted Model Updates before transmission

Derivative 13.5: The "Inverse" or Failure Mode (Privacy-Centric Data Purge)

Enabling Description: This derivative prioritizes user privacy and fails by securely purging sensitive data under specific conditions. The device features a user-configurable "privacy-zone" geofence. If the device remains within a designated privacy zone (e.g., home, office) for a prolonged period, or if it detects unauthorized access attempts (e.g., multiple failed biometric scans, removal from an authorized cradle), the encryption module triggers a cryptographic erase of the sensitive location information stored in the storage module. This erase is performed by overwriting the encryption keys with random data, rendering the stored ciphertext irrecoverable. The locational information module also ceases logging when within a privacy zone or upon detection of a critical privacy breach event. A limited "black box" mode retains only non-identifying aggregate movement statistics (e.g., total distance traveled per day) encrypted with a separate, publicly auditable key.

stateDiagram-v2
    state NormalOperating {
        NM_Logging: Log and Encrypt Location
    }
    state PrivacyZoneDetected {
        PZD_Monitoring: Monitor Time in Zone
        PZD_StopLogging: Cease Logging Sensitive Data
    }
    state UnauthorizedAccessAttempt {
        UAA_Count: Count Failed Attempts
        UAA_TriggerPurge: Trigger Cryptographic Erase
    }
    state DataPurged {
        DP_Irrecoverable: Keys Overwritten
        DP_BlackBox: Aggregate Stats Only
    }

    [*] --> NormalOperating
    NormalOperating --> PrivacyZoneDetected : Enter Privacy Zone
    PrivacyZoneDetected --> NormalOperating : Exit Privacy Zone
    NormalOperating --> UnauthorizedAccessAttempt : Failed Access Attempt
    UnauthorizedAccessAttempt --> DataPurged : Max Attempts / Critical Breach
    PrivacyZoneDetected --> DataPurged : Prolonged Stay in Zone (Configured Threshold)
    DataPurged --> [*] : Device Reset / User Re-initiate

Derivatives for Claim 19 (System with removable storage and reader)

Claim 19 Summary: A system including a location information device (with removable storage as in Claim 1) and a computing device with a reader configured to read and a processor configured to execute a decryption program for decrypting the encrypted location information from the removable storage module.

Derivative 19.1: Material & Component Substitution (Bio-Authentication Key Module)

Enabling Description: This system replaces the generic "code string" input with a multi-factor biometric authentication process integrated into the removable storage module itself. The removable storage module (e.g., a secure element microSD card) incorporates a dedicated System-on-Chip (SoC) with a fingerprint sensor and a secure enclave. The device records location data and encrypts it using keys derived from a unique biometric hash. To decrypt, the computing device's reader is replaced by a specialized docking station that interfaces with the secure element microSD card. The user must provide a live fingerprint scan to the secure element's integrated sensor. The SoC verifies the biometric data and, if authenticated, releases the decryption keys within its secure enclave to the computing device's processor for on-the-fly decryption, without ever exposing the raw keys to the main computing device. The docking station itself has a hardened enclosure (e.g., carbon fiber reinforced polymer) to prevent physical tampering.

graph TD
    A[Location Device Housing] --> B(Locational Module);
    B --> C(Encryption Module);
    C -- Encrypted Location Data --> D[Removable Secure-Element MicroSD Card];
    D -- Integrated Fingerprint Sensor + Secure Enclave SoC --> D_Sub;
    A --> D;
    D -- Physical Interface --> E[Specialized Docking Station (Hardened Housing)];
    E --> F(Computing Device Processor);
    F -- Executes Decryption Program --> G(User Interface for Decrypted Data);
    D_Sub -- Biometric Verification --> F;

Derivative 19.2: Operational Parameter Expansion (Global Scale Fleet Management)

Enabling Description: This system manages a global fleet of autonomous vehicles (e.g., long-haul trucks, cargo ships). The location information device on each vehicle logs data at sub-meter precision (RTK-GNSS) every second, along with vehicle telemetry (engine diagnostics, fuel consumption, driver behavior metrics). The removable storage module is an industrial-grade, hot-swappable solid-state drive (SSD) with a minimum 10 TB capacity, designed for millions of write cycles and extreme temperature resilience. At designated fleet depots worldwide, the SSDs are automatically ejected and inserted into high-speed computing clusters acting as "readers." These clusters utilize massively parallel processing (e.g., GPU acceleration) to decrypt petabytes of encrypted telemetry and location data, allowing real-time analytics of fleet performance, route optimization, and predictive maintenance across the entire global operation.

flowchart TD
    A[Autonomous Vehicle] --> B(RTK-GNSS Module);
    B -- Location + Telemetry (1Hz) --> C(Encryption Module);
    C -- Encrypted Data --> D[Hot-Swappable 10TB Industrial SSD];
    D -- Automated Ejection/Insertion --> E[Global Fleet Depot (High-Speed Computing Cluster)];
    E -- Massively Parallel Decryption --> F(Fleet Management Analytics Platform);
    F --> G(Route Optimization / Predictive Maintenance);

Derivative 19.3: Cross-Domain Application (Geological Survey & Environmental Monitoring)

Enabling Description: In geological surveys, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or ground robots carry the devices. The "location information" includes precise geological coordinates, multispectral imagery timestamps, seismic sensor data, and soil sample location tags. The device's removable storage module is a ruggedized, high-capacity industrial SD card. The computing device is a field-deployable rugged laptop or tablet equipped with a multi-card reader. The decryption program on the computing device integrates with GIS (Geographic Information System) software (e.g., QGIS open-source) to automatically overlay decrypted survey data onto geographical maps, cross-referencing with existing geological databases. The system allows field geologists to rapidly decrypt, visualize, and validate data on-site, enhancing survey efficiency and accuracy.

graph LR
    A[UAV/Ground Robot] --> B(Locational Module + Sensors);
    B -- Encrypted Survey Data --> C[Ruggedized Removable SD Card];
    C -- Card Reader --> D[Field-Deployable Rugged Laptop];
    D -- Decryption Program + QGIS --> E(Geospatial Data Visualization);
    E -- Comparison --> F(Existing Geological Databases);

Derivative 19.4: Integration with Emerging Tech (Decentralized Identity & Smart Contracts)

Enabling Description: This system leverages decentralized identity (DID) and smart contracts for access control and verifiable data ownership. The "code string" for decryption is replaced by a digital credential issued as a verifiable attestation stored on a user's decentralized identity wallet. When a removable storage module is inserted into the computing device's reader, the decryption program initiates a challenge-response protocol. The user's DID wallet must present the appropriate verifiable credential, cryptographically signed by an authorized issuer (e.g., the device manufacturer, or a regulatory body). This credential, once verified, triggers a smart contract on a blockchain, which then releases a temporary, one-time decryption key to the computing device. This ensures that only owners with verifiable identity and permissions can decrypt data, and the access event is immutably recorded on the blockchain. The removable storage module itself contains a secure element for hardware-backed DID key storage.

sequenceDiagram
    participant D as Location Device
    participant R as Removable Storage Module
    participant C as Computing Device (Reader + Processor)
    participant U as User (DID Wallet)
    participant S as Smart Contract (Blockchain)
    participant I as Issuer (Verifiable Credential)

    D->>R: Store Encrypted Location Data
    U->>C: Insert R, Initiate Decryption
    C->>U: Challenge for Verifiable Credential
    U->>I: Request Credential (if not already held)
    I->>U: Issue Signed Verifiable Credential
    U->>C: Present Verifiable Credential
    C->>S: Verify Credential and Request Decryption Key
    S->>C: Release Temporary Decryption Key
    C->>R: Decrypt Data from R
    C->>U: Display Decrypted Information
    S->>S: Log Access Event on Blockchain

Derivative 19.5: The "Inverse" or Failure Mode (Tamper-Evident Data Obfuscation)

Enabling Description: This system focuses on making data access highly detectable upon unauthorized removal or tampering. If the removable storage module's integrity is compromised (e.g., through physical stress detected by embedded strain gauges, or an unauthorized insertion into a non-approved reader detected by voltage anomalies), the encryption module triggers a deliberate, but reversible, data obfuscation layer on top of the existing encryption. This could involve scrambling sector allocation tables, injecting false header information, or modifying timestamps, making it appear as if the data is corrupted or unusable, even if eventually decrypted. The authorized decryption program on the computing device has the specific algorithm to undo this obfuscation layer before attempting standard decryption. The detection of tampering or unauthorized access is also logged immutably within a secure immutable log on the storage module itself, serving as forensic evidence.

stateDiagram-v2
    state NormalOperation {
        NO_Encrypted: Data is Encrypted
    }
    state TamperingDetected {
        TD_Physical: Strain Gauge Triggered
        TD_Electrical: Voltage Anomaly (Unauthorized Reader)
        TD_ImmutableLog: Log Tamper Event
    }
    state DataObfuscated {
        DO_Scrambled: Sector Tables Scrambled
        DO_FalseHeaders: False Data Headers Injected
        DO_ModifiedTimestamps: Timestamps Modified
    }

    [*] --> NormalOperation
    NormalOperation --> TamperingDetected : Physical Tampering / Unauthorized Access
    TamperingDetected --> DataObfuscated : Trigger Obfuscation Layer
    DataObfuscated --> DecryptionProcess : Authorized Computing Device (Undoes Obfuscation)
    DecryptionProcess --> [*] : Decrypted Data

Derivatives for Claim 22 (System with general storage and transmission module)

Claim 22 Summary: A system including a location information device (with a general storage module and a transmission module) and an external computing device with a connectivity device for receiving, and a processor for executing a decryption program for the encrypted location information.

Derivative 22.1: Material & Component Substitution (Photonic Integrated Circuit for Secure Transmission)

Enabling Description: This system replaces traditional RF/electrical transmission with secure, high-bandwidth optical communication. The location information device's transmission module is a PIC (Photonic Integrated Circuit) transponder, converting encrypted location data into modulated light signals. The external computing device integrates a PIC receiver for optical data input. The housing of both the device and the external computing device's connectivity module are designed with optical ports and alignment mechanisms. Data is encrypted using quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols established over a free-space optical link or fiber optic cable, generating session keys for AES-256 GCM encryption of location data. This provides unconditional security for data in transit. The storage module is a high-speed SLC NAND flash for data buffering before optical transmission.

graph TD
    A[Location Device Housing] --> B(Locational Module);
    B --> C(Encryption Module - AES-256 GCM);
    C -- Encrypted Data --> D[SLC NAND Buffer];
    D -- Data --> E[PIC Transponder (Optical Transmission)];
    E -- Optical Link (QKD-Secured) --> F[PIC Receiver (External Computing Device)];
    F --> G(External Computing Device Processor);
    G -- Decryption Program --> H(Decrypted Location Info);
    QKD(Quantum Key Distribution) -- Session Keys --> C;

Derivative 22.2: Operational Parameter Expansion (Deep Space Probe Data Relay)

Enabling Description: This system is for transmitting encrypted telemetry and positional data from deep-space probes. The "location information" includes the probe's trajectory, attitude (orientation), and sensor readings from distant cosmic phenomena. The device's locational module uses an optical navigation system (star trackers) and an onboard IMU for precise positioning relative to celestial bodies. The transmission module is a high-gain directional antenna operating in the Ka-band, communicating with Earth-based deep space networks (DSN). Data is encrypted with long-period symmetric-key algorithms (e.g., Threefish-1024) and interleaved with Reed-Solomon error correction codes for resilience against long-distance transmission errors and cosmic ray interference. The external computing device is a DSN ground station, equipped with specialized signal processing hardware and algorithms to extract and decrypt the weak, highly attenuated signals. The storage module on the probe is radiation-hardened PCM (Phase-Change Memory) for non-volatile, high-endurance storage.

flowchart TD
    A[Deep Space Probe (Radiation-Hardened)] --> B(Optical Nav/IMU Locational Module);
    B -- Trajectory/Telemetry --> C(Threefish-1024 Encryption + Reed-Solomon ECC);
    C -- Encrypted Data --> D[Radiation-Hardened PCM Storage];
    D -- Buffered Data --> E[High-Gain Ka-band Antenna];
    E -- Deep Space Link --> F[DSN Ground Station (Specialized Receiver)];
    F --> G(External Computing Device - Decryption + Signal Processing);
    G --> H(Mission Control & Analysis);

Derivative 22.3: Cross-Domain Application (Smart Agriculture Field Monitoring)

Enabling Description: This system monitors agricultural machinery (e.g., autonomous tractors, drones for crop spraying) and environmental conditions across vast farmlands. The "location information" includes the precise coordinates of farming operations (e.g., seeding, spraying routes), soil moisture levels from attached sensors, and crop health metrics (e.g., NDVI from spectral cameras). The device is ruggedized for outdoor farm use. Its transmission module utilizes a long-range LoRaWAN radio for low-power, wide-area communication across miles of fields to a central farm hub (the external computing device). The encryption module uses AES-128 for lightweight, secure transmission. The storage module is an industrial-grade eMMC. The external computing device (farm hub) aggregates data, decrypts it, and feeds it into an agricultural management software platform to optimize irrigation, fertilization, and pest control strategies across the farm.

graph TD
    A[Autonomous Tractor/Drone (Ruggedized)] --> B(GNSS + Soil/Crop Sensors);
    B -- Location + Sensor Data --> C(AES-128 Encryption Module);
    C -- Encrypted Data --> D[Industrial eMMC Storage];
    D -- Buffered Data --> E[LoRaWAN Transmission Module];
    E -- Long-Range Radio Link --> F[Farm Hub (External Computing Device)];
    F --> G(Decryption + Farm Management Software);
    G --> H(Optimal Farming Strategies);

Derivative 22.4: Integration with Emerging Tech (AI-Driven Threat Intelligence & Secure Cloud Storage)

Enabling Description: This system transmits encrypted location data for analysis by an AI-driven threat intelligence platform and stores it in secure cloud storage. The device includes a locational information module (e.g., assisted GNSS, cellular triangulation) that continuously logs movements. The processing module employs a local AI model for detecting suspicious patterns (e.g., loitering in restricted areas, unexpected deviations from approved routes). The encryption module encrypts all raw and AI-inferred data using FIPS 140-3 validated encryption, with keys rotated frequently and managed by a Hardware Security Module (HSM). The transmission module uses a secure cellular link (e.g., 5G with IPSec VPN) to stream encrypted data to a cloud-based external computing platform. This platform uses a federated AI model to analyze aggregated encrypted data (without decrypting individual records) for global threat patterns. Only authorized security analysts with multi-factor authentication can access specific decrypted records through a zero-trust architecture. All data transfers and decryption requests are logged on a transparent, immutable permissioned blockchain for auditability.

sequenceDiagram
    participant D as Location Device
    participant L as Locational Module
    participant P as Processing (Edge AI)
    participant E as Encryption (FIPS 140-3 HSM)
    participant S as Storage
    participant T as Transmission (5G IPSec)
    participant C as Cloud Computing Platform (External)
    participant A as AI Threat Intelligence Platform
    participant B as Permissioned Blockchain
    participant U as Authorized Security Analyst

    L->>P: Raw Location Data
    P->>P: Local AI Anomaly Detection
    P->>E: Raw Data + AI Inferences
    E->>S: Encrypted Data (for buffer)
    S->>T: Encrypted Data Stream
    T->>C: Secure Transmission
    C->>A: Encrypted Data (for federated analysis)
    A->>C: Federated AI Insights
    U->>C: MFA Decryption Request (Zero-Trust)
    C->>E: Request Key (via HSM)
    E->>C: Transmit Key
    C->>U: Decrypted Data (specific records)
    C->>B: Log All Data Transfers & Decryption Requests

Derivative 22.5: The "Inverse" or Failure Mode (Privacy-Preserving Telemetry Relay)

Enabling Description: This derivative focuses on protecting privacy during failure or distress by transforming sensitive location data into anonymized, aggregate telemetry. In a "privacy-preserving telemetry mode" (activated by user, system fault, or geofence), the locational information module drastically reduces the precision and frequency of location fixes (e.g., bounding box coordinates rather than exact points, 1-hour intervals). The processing module aggregates these imprecise coordinates into "heatmaps" or statistical representations of general movement patterns. The encryption module applies homomorphic encryption to these aggregated statistics, so that the external computing device can perform analysis on the encrypted data without decrypting individual (even imprecise) location points. The transmission module then sends these homomorphically encrypted aggregate statistics. Critical alerts (e.g., SOS signal) may include a single, time-limited, precise encrypted location, but only if explicit user consent or a pre-defined emergency protocol is triggered. The storage module maintains only the homomorphically encrypted aggregates.

stateDiagram-v2
    state NormalOperation {
        NO_PreciseLogging: Full Precision, Frequent Logging
        NO_FullEncryption: Full AES Encryption
    }
    state PrivacyTelemetryMode {
        PTM_ReducedPrecision: Bounding Box / Low Frequency
        PTM_AggregateData: Generate Heatmaps / Stats
        PTM_HomomorphicEncryption: Encrypt Aggregates
        PTM_Transmit: Send Encrypted Aggregates
    }
    state EmergencyAlert {
        EA_ConsentRequired: User Consent for Precise
        EA_TimeLimitedKey: Key for Single Precise Location
    }

    [*] --> NormalOperation
    NormalOperation --> PrivacyTelemetryMode : User Activates / System Fault / Geofence
    PrivacyTelemetryMode --> EmergencyAlert : User Triggers SOS
    EmergencyAlert --> NormalOperation : Emergency Resolved
    PrivacyTelemetryMode --> NormalOperation : Deactivate PTM

Combination Prior Art Scenarios with Open-Source Standards

These scenarios combine elements of US Patent 8085192 with existing open-source standards, demonstrating how the core inventive concepts can be implemented using publicly available technologies and specifications.

  1. OpenStreetMap (OSM) & OGC Standards for Secure Geo-Tagged Data:

    • Description: A device implementing Claim 13 (general storage and encryption) stores encrypted location information, including routes and points of interest. This encrypted data also includes metadata tagged with OpenStreetMap (OSM) object IDs or categories. When transferred to an external computing device, the decryption program integrates with open-source GIS libraries (e.g., GDAL/OGR, PostGIS) that can consume and render OSM data. Decrypted location information (e.g., GPX tracks, GeoJSON points) is then spatially joined with OSM layers or styled according to Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC) standards (e.g., WKT, WKB, GML) for display and analysis. The device itself could utilize a stripped-down Linux kernel (e.g., OpenWRT) and open-source GNSS middleware (e.g., RTKLIB) for its locational module.
    • Relevance: This demonstrates the secure storage and decryption of location data, then its immediate integration and visualization with widely accepted, open-source geospatial standards and data, making further "improvements" in map integration obvious.

  2. MQTT and TLS/SSL for Secure IoT Location Data Transmission:

    • Description: A system based on Claim 22 (general storage and transmission) utilizes the MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) protocol, an OASIS standard for IoT messaging, to transmit encrypted location data from the device to an external computing device (acting as an MQTT broker). The transmission module uses TLS/SSL (Transport Layer Security/Secure Sockets Layer), an open standard for cryptographic protocols, to secure the MQTT connection, ensuring end-to-end encryption of the data channel. The device's encryption module performs the payload encryption, and the external computing device's decryption program then processes the received, authenticated, and decrypted MQTT messages. The device might run an embedded OS like FreeRTOS or Zephyr with open-source MQTT client libraries.
    • Relevance: This establishes prior art for using standard, open-source IoT communication protocols and security layers for transmitting encrypted location information, covering a broad range of networked device applications.

  3. Keycloak/OAuth2 for User Authentication and Data Access Control:

    • Description: For devices incorporating user verification (e.g., Claims 3, 16), the system integrates with Keycloak (an open-source identity and access management solution) using the OAuth2 (Open Authorization 2.0) framework. When a user attempts to access or decrypt sensitive location information (either on the device with a code string, or via an external computing device), the system delegates authentication to a Keycloak server. The device or the external computing application acts as an OAuth2 client, redirecting the user for authentication (e.g., username/password, MFA) against Keycloak. Upon successful authentication, Keycloak issues an access token. This token, containing claims about the user's identity and permissions, is then used by the device's processing module or the external computing device's decryption program to authorize access to decryption keys or the encrypted data.
    • Relevance: This shows how standard, open-source identity and access management solutions can be seamlessly integrated with the patent's core concept of controlled access to encrypted location data, making claims around user verification and decryption based on identity obvious.

Generated 5/16/2026, 6:46:33 PM