Prior art — US Patent 9794797

Prior Art Analysis for US Patent 9,794,797

The following analysis details the most relevant prior art cited during the prosecution of US Patent 9,794,797. The analysis focuses on how these references relate to the independent claims (1, 8, and 14) and their potential to anticipate these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102.

1. US Patent Application Publication No. 2005/0073981 A1

Full Citation: Gu, et al., "Game theoretic resource allocation for multi-hop wireless ad hoc networks," (Hereinafter "Gu"). Published April 7, 2005. Filed October 1, 2004.
Brief Description: Gu discloses a system for allocating resources, such as bandwidth and power, in a multi-hop ad-hoc wireless network using game theory. The explicit goal is to incentivize nodes to cooperate in forwarding packets. Gu models the resource allocation problem as a cooperative game where nodes (players) form groups to relay traffic. The system aims to find a "core" solution for the game, which represents a stable state where no group of nodes has an incentive to deviate from the cooperative strategy. The framework is designed to achieve fair and efficient resource allocation.
Potential Anticipation of Claims:
- Claims 1 and 8 (Game Theory): Gu strongly anticipates the core concepts of these claims. It explicitly teaches a wireless ad-hoc network where resource allocation decisions are made based on a game-theoretic model. The nodes act as players in a game, and their decisions (e.g., how much power to use, which packets to forward) are analogous to selecting a "state." The goal of the game is to maximize utility for the cooperating nodes, which directly maps to the "subjective value function" recited in the claims. While Gu focuses on power and bandwidth allocation rather than antenna radiation patterns, the underlying decision-making framework is identical. The game-theoretic decision in Gu is based on the potential actions and payoffs of other nodes in the network.
- Claim 14 (VCG Auction): Gu does not explicitly mention or teach the use of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. It focuses on a different branch of game theory related to cooperative games and finding the "core." Therefore, Gu would not anticipate claim 14, which specifically requires the negotiation to be based on a VCG auction.

2. US Patent No. 8,401,570 B2

Full Citation: Agrawal, et al., "Method and system for market-based radio spectrum access," (Hereinafter "Agrawal"). Issued March 19, 2013. Filed May 27, 2008.
Brief Description: Agrawal describes a market-based system for dynamic spectrum access. It proposes a spectrum auction mechanism where secondary users (SUs) can bid for temporary access to licensed spectrum from primary users (PUs). The system uses an auction to determine which SUs get to use the spectrum and at what price, thereby creating an economic incentive for efficient spectrum sharing. The disclosure mentions various auction types, including Vickrey auctions, to ensure truthful bidding.
Potential Anticipation of Claims:
- Claims 1 and 8 (Game Theory): Agrawal teaches a game theory-based decision process, as an auction is an application of game theory. The decision for a secondary user to access spectrum is based on its bid (reflecting its subjective value) and the bids of other SUs. However, Agrawal does not explicitly link this auction-based decision to the selection of a specific directional antenna radiation pattern state. It is focused on gaining access to a frequency band, not on interference mitigation through beam steering.
- Claim 14 (VCG Auction): Agrawal provides strong evidence for anticipating this claim. It teaches a wireless network where resource allocation (spectrum access) is handled by an automated negotiation process based on an auction. Agrawal explicitly suggests Vickrey auctions, of which the VCG auction is a generalized form for multiple items. The use of this auction mechanism to allocate resources among competing nodes aligns directly with the limitations of claim 14. However, a key missing element for a direct anticipation is the explicit teaching of using this auction to select the directional state of an antenna. Agrawal's focus is on spectrum frequency, not antenna patterns.

3. US Patent No. 7,349,699 B2

Full Citation: Terry, et al., "Method and system for providing access to a wireless communication network," (Hereinafter "Terry"). Issued March 25, 2008. Filed November 24, 2003.
Brief Description: Terry discloses a system where a wireless device can operate in different modes, including a peer-to-peer (ad-hoc) mode and an infrastructure mode (connecting to an access point). The patent describes methods for devices to negotiate with each other to establish communication links, considering factors like power levels and interference. It aims to improve network efficiency by allowing devices to make local decisions about how to connect and communicate.
Potential Anticipation of Claims:
- Claims 1, 8, and 14: Terry does not appear to anticipate any of the independent claims. While it deals with ad-hoc wireless communication and interference considerations, it lacks any disclosure of using game theory or formal auction mechanisms (like VCG) to make decisions. The negotiation described in Terry is based on simpler protocols and rule sets rather than the economic and game-theoretic optimization central to the '797 patent. Furthermore, it does not specifically mention optimizing the directional state of an antenna as part of this negotiation.

4. US Patent No. 8,170,591 B2

Full Citation: Jain, et al., "System and method for self-optimizing radio frequency communications," (Hereinafter "Jain"). Issued May 1, 2012. Filed May 19, 2008.
Brief Description: Jain describes a cognitive radio system where wireless devices can sense their environment and autonomously adjust their transmission parameters to optimize performance and avoid interference. The parameters that can be adjusted include frequency, bandwidth, power, and modulation. The system is described as "self-optimizing" and operates in a decentralized manner. The optimization can be based on various utility functions, such as maximizing throughput or minimizing power consumption.
Potential Anticipation of Claims:
- Claims 1 and 8 (Game Theory): Jain discloses a system that performs automated, decentralized optimization based on a utility function, which is synonymous with the "subjective value function" in the claims. The nodes make decisions by considering their environment, which includes the presence and behavior of other nodes. However, Jain does not explicitly frame this optimization problem using formal game theory. The decision-making is described more as a cognitive, rule-based process. A potential argument for anticipation would depend on whether the described "self-optimization" inherently constitutes a game-theoretic approach, which is debatable.
- Claim 14 (VCG Auction): Jain does not disclose any form of auction, let alone a VCG auction, for its optimization process. Therefore, it would not anticipate claim 14.