Patent 6317838

Derivative works

Defensive disclosure: derivative variations of each claim designed to render future incremental improvements obvious or non-novel.

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Derivative works

Defensive disclosure: derivative variations of each claim designed to render future incremental improvements obvious or non-novel.

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Defensive Disclosure: Derivative Variations of US Patent 6317838

This document outlines derivative variations of the inventions described in US patent 6317838, "Method and architecture to provide a secured remote access to private resources." The objective is to proactively disclose these conceptual improvements and alternative implementations as prior art, thereby rendering future incremental advancements by competitors obvious or lacking novelty. The current date is April 26, 2026.

Derivative Variations

1. Material & Component Substitution: FPGA-Accelerated Centralized Security with Quantum-Resistant Cryptography

Enabling Description:
This derivative implements the centralized security means (5) within the firewall (2) using Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) logic for hardware-accelerated authentication and filtering. Instead of a general-purpose CPU, critical security functions, such as cryptographic operations for user authentication data and the comparison of received security data with stored authentication data (Claim 1b, first stage), are offloaded to dedicated FPGA fabric. The security storing means (DB S) utilizes a distributed, immutable ledger (e.g., based on a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm like Dilithium or CRYSTALS-Kyber) for storing security profiles and user authentication data, ensuring data integrity and resistance to future cryptanalytic advances. Network proxies (7a-7p) are implemented as FPGA-accelerated network function virtualization (NFV) instances, optimizing throughput and reducing latency for high-volume authenticated sessions. The security data itself, including user's authentication data and security profiles (Claim 1a), is encrypted using these quantum-resistant algorithms before storage and during transmission within the secure perimeter.

graph TD
    A[Remote User's Workstation] -- Authenticated Request (Quantum-Resistant Encrypted OTP/Login) --> B(Firewall)
    B -- Ingress Filter (IP, Port) --> C{FPGA-Accelerated Centralized Security Means}
    C -- Decrypt/Authenticate (Quantum-Resistant Crypto Hardware) --> D[Security Storing Means (Distributed Immutable Ledger)]
    D -- Retrieve Security Profile --> C
    C -- Enforce Rules (FPGA Logic) --> E[FPGA-Accelerated Proxy (NFV)]
    E -- Forward Secure Session --> F[Private Resource (S1-Sm)]
    D -- Store Audit Log (Immutable) --> G[Audit & Monitoring System]

2. Operational Parameter Expansion: Nanoscale Microservice Access Control

Enabling Description:
This derivative extends the method and architecture to secure access to individual microservices or "nanoresources" within a highly distributed, fine-grained computing environment, operating at a logical "nanoscale" of resource access. The "private resources" (Claim 1a, Claim 8) are now individual API endpoints or functions exposed by microservices. The centralized security means (5) in the firewall (2) performs context-aware micro-authorization for each API call or function invocation. Security profiles (Claim 1a) are defined not just per user or server, but per user-to-microservice-function matrix, indicating granular permissions (e.g., User A can 'read' /api/order/123, but not 'update'). This system is designed to handle millions of simultaneous, short-lived micro-access requests with sub-millisecond latency. The "security data associated with said private resources" (Claim 1a) now includes specific API endpoint paths and method permissions (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE) for each microservice. The firewall’s centralized security means integrates with an API Gateway that intercepts all internal microservice traffic for granular policy enforcement.

graph TD
    A[Remote User] --> B(API Gateway/Firewall)
    B -- API Request (/order/123, Method: GET) --> C{Centralized Security Means}
    C -- Authenticate User (Claim 1b) --> D[Security Storing Means (Micro-Authorization Profiles)]
    D -- Retrieve Fine-Grained Profile (User X, Microservice Y, Function Z) --> C
    C -- Contextual Policy Enforcement --> E{Microservice Router}
    E -- Authorized API Call --> F[Microservice Instance 1 (Order Service)]
    E -- Unauthorized API Call --> G[Access Denied]

3. Cross-Domain Application: Agricultural Equipment Fleet Management

Enabling Description:
Applying the method and architecture of US6317838 to precision agriculture, a remote farmer (user) gains secured access to private resources comprising a fleet of autonomous agricultural equipment (tractors, harvesters, drones) and associated farm management software (e.g., yield mapping, irrigation control systems). The digital data processing system is the farm's central control network. The firewall is a ruggedized industrial gateway installed at the edge of the farm network, protecting the equipment and software from external threats. The centralized security means within this gateway authenticates the farmer and provides a security profile (Claim 1a) that details which specific equipment (e.g., Tractor #3), which control functions (e.g., 'start engine', 'adjust irrigation flow'), and which software applications (e.g., 'view drone telemetry') the farmer may access with a single sign-on. One-time passwords (Claim 7) are generated by a ruggedized handheld device carried by the farmer, or an authenticated farm management tablet, for initial login.

flowchart LR
    A[Remote Farmer (Tablet/PC)] -- Initial Login (OTP) --> B(Industrial Farm Gateway/Firewall)
    B -- Authenticate User --> C{Centralized Security Module}
    C -- Access Control Policy & SSO Data --> D[Farm Security DB (Profiles, Permissions)]
    D -- Security Profile --> C
    C -- Authorized Access --> E[Farm Management Software Suite]
    subgraph Farm Network
        E -- SSO Access --> F[Autonomous Tractor #1 (Resource)]
        E -- SSO Access --> G[Irrigation Control System (Resource)]
        E -- SSO Access --> H[Agricultural Drone (Resource)]
    end
    B -- Telemetry/Control --> E

4. Cross-Domain Application: Deep-Space Satellite Constellation Management

Enabling Description:
In this derivative, the invention secures remote access for mission control engineers (users) to private resources comprising individual satellites and their onboard systems within a deep-space constellation. The "digital data processing system" is the satellite ground station network, with each satellite acting as a "private resource." The "firewall" is implemented as a specialized space-ground communication gateway, designed to handle extreme latency and intermittent connectivity inherent in deep-space links. The "centralized security means" is housed within this gateway, authenticating mission control personnel and providing a security profile (Claim 1a) for SSO access to various satellite subsystems (e.g., propulsion, payload, telemetry, attitude control). One-time passwords (Claim 7), potentially derived from a combination of time and satellite ephemeris data, are used for initial authentication. This system prioritizes secure command execution and telemetry retrieval over highly unreliable channels, maintaining session state despite prolonged communication outages.

sequenceDiagram
    participant M as Mission Control Engineer
    participant G as Ground Station Gateway/Firewall
    participant S as Satellite 1 (Private Resource)
    participant P as Satellite 2 (Private Resource)

    M->>G: Initial Login Request (OTP + Engineer ID)
    G->>G: Authenticate User (Centralized Security Means)
    G->>G: Fetch Security Profile (Engineer Access Rights)
    G-->>M: Authentication Success (SSO Token for Session)
    M->>G: Command Satellite 1 (SSO Token)
    G->>G: Filter/Authorize (Security Profile Check)
    G->>S: Secure Command Link
    S-->>G: Telemetry Data
    G-->>M: Forward Telemetry
    M->>G: Access Satellite 2 (SSO Token)
    G->>G: Filter/Authorize
    G->>P: Secure Command Link

5. Cross-Domain Application: Smart Home/Building Management (Pro-Consumer)

Enabling Description:
This derivative applies the patent to pro-consumer smart home or building management. The "remote user" is the homeowner or building manager, accessing "private resources" like intelligent HVAC systems, advanced security cameras, access control systems, and smart appliance networks. The "digital data processing system" is the local smart home/building server (e.g., a home automation hub). The "firewall" is a residential/commercial IoT gateway device, enforcing perimeter security. The "centralized security means" within this gateway authenticates the user and retrieves a security profile (Claim 1a) that grants SSO access to various smart devices and control panels (e.g., adjust thermostat, view camera feed, unlock door, manage energy usage data). Protocols (Claim 4) include Zigbee, Z-Wave, and Matter, with an authentication layer implemented over them. The system allows a single login to manage a diverse array of smart objects within the physical space.

graph TD
    A[Remote User Device (Phone/Tablet)] -- Authenticated Request (Login/Password) --> B(IoT Gateway/Firewall)
    B -- User Auth --> C{Centralized Security Module}
    C -- Retrieve User Profile --> D[Home Security Database]
    D -- Security Profile --> C
    C -- Authorized SSO Access --> E[Smart Home Hub]
    subgraph Smart Home Network
        E -- Control/Access --> F[HVAC System]
        E -- Control/Access --> G[Security Cameras]
        E -- Control/Access --> H[Door Locks]
        E -- Control/Access --> I[Smart Appliances]
    end
    B -- Encrypted Tunnel --> E

6. Integration with Emerging Tech: AI-Driven Adaptive Security Profiles

Enabling Description:
This derivative integrates AI into the centralized security means (5) and security storing means (DB S) of US6317838. The security profiles (Claim 1a) are no longer static but dynamically adapted by an AI engine based on continuous monitoring of user behavior, network conditions, and threat intelligence. The AI engine, a deep neural network trained on historical access patterns and security events, constantly analyzes the remote user's (U X) behavior (e.g., access times, resource types, data volumes, geolocation) against their baseline profile. If an anomaly is detected, the AI automatically triggers an adjustment of the user's security profile in real-time. This could involve reducing access privileges (e.g., limiting read-only access), enforcing additional multi-factor authentication for sensitive resources, or temporarily blocking access until re-verification. The "rules derived from said security data" (Claim 1b) are thus fluid, reflecting an adaptive security posture.

stateDiagram-v2
    state "Remote User Access" as UserAccess
    state "Firewall Centralized Security Means" as FirewallSecurity
    state "Security Storing Means (AI-Managed Profiles)" as AIManagedProfiles
    state "AI Behavioral Analysis" as AIAnalysis
    state "Private Resources" as Resources

    UserAccess --> FirewallSecurity: Authenticated Session Request
    FirewallSecurity --> AIManagedProfiles: Retrieve Baseline Profile
    AIManagedProfiles --> FirewallSecurity: Baseline Profile
    FirewallSecurity --> Resources: Grant Initial Access
    FirewallSecurity --> AIAnalysis: Stream Access Telemetry
    AIAnalysis --> AIAnalysis: Detect Anomalies (ML Model)
    AIAnalysis --> AIManagedProfiles: Update Profile (Adaptive)
    AIManagedProfiles --> FirewallSecurity: Push New Profile
    FirewallSecurity --> Resources: Adjust Access (Dynamically)
    AIAnalysis --> FirewallSecurity: Alert/Action (e.g., Re-auth)
    FirewallSecurity --> UserAccess: Challenge/Revoke

7. Integration with Emerging Tech: IoT Sensor-Enhanced Contextual SSO

Enabling Description:
This derivative enhances the Single Sign-On (SSO) mechanism (Claim 2, Claim 6) and the authentication process (Claim 1b) by integrating real-time contextual data from Internet of Things (IoT) sensors. The "security data" (Claim 1a) and security profiles are augmented with environmental, biometric, or location-based context. For example, remote users accessing the system from a known, physically secure location (verified by local IoT presence sensors and geo-fencing) might receive broader SSO access or require less frequent re-authentication. Conversely, access from an unknown device or location, or if local environmental sensors detect unusual conditions (e.g., unauthorized physical intrusion near a server), could automatically trigger a re-authentication prompt, elevate authentication requirements (e.g., enforce biometric verification via a wearable IoT device), or restrict access entirely. The firewall's centralized security means (5) actively subscribes to a secure IoT message broker for these real-time contextual inputs to enrich its decision-making.

flowchart TD
    A[Remote User Device] -- Authenticate (Claim 1b) --> B(Firewall/Centralized Security)
    B -- Retrieve Security Profile --> C[Security DB]
    subgraph IoT Context Layer
        D[IoT Gateway] -- Sensor Data (Location, Environment, Biometrics) --> E(IoT Message Broker)
        E -- Real-time Context --> B
    end
    B -- Contextual Policy Decision --> F{SSO Token}
    F -- SSO Access (Claim 2) --> G[Private Resource 1]
    F -- SSO Access --> H[Private Resource 2]
    B -- Adaptive Auth Request --> A

8. Integration with Emerging Tech: Blockchain-Verified Access Credentials and Profiles

Enabling Description:
This derivative leverages blockchain technology for tamper-proof storage and verification of user authentication data and security profiles (Claim 1a). The "security storing means" (Claim 1a, Claim 8) is implemented as a distributed ledger (blockchain) where user identities, public keys, and authorization profiles are recorded as immutable transactions. When a remote user (U X) attempts to authenticate, the centralized security means (5) in the firewall (2) verifies the user's cryptographic signature against their public key stored on the blockchain. Furthermore, changes to security profiles or user privileges are recorded as new blocks, providing an auditable, transparent history. The firewall fetches the latest, cryptographically verified security profile from the blockchain, ensuring that no unauthorized modifications have occurred. This decentralizes trust and dramatically increases the integrity of the authorization system. One-time passwords (Claim 7) can be derived using seed values or challenges issued and recorded via the blockchain.

sequenceDiagram
    participant U as Remote User
    participant FW as Firewall/Centralized Security
    participant BC as Blockchain (Security Data Ledger)
    participant PR as Private Resource

    U->>FW: Authentication Request (Signed by User's Private Key)
    FW->>BC: Verify User Public Key & Latest Profile Hash
    BC-->>FW: User's Valid Public Key & Current Profile Hash
    FW->>FW: Authenticate User (Claim 1b)
    FW->>BC: Retrieve Full Security Profile (Validated)
    BC-->>FW: Immutable Security Profile
    FW->>FW: Filter Access Request (Claim 1b)
    FW->>PR: Provide Security Data (SSO Token for Session)
    PR-->>FW: Acknowledge Access
    FW->>BC: Record Access Event (Transaction)

9. The "Inverse" or Failure Mode: Graceful Degradation to "Read-Only Emergency Access"

Enabling Description:
This derivative implements a graceful degradation mechanism for the method (Claim 1) and architecture (Claim 8) in the event of a detected security breach, system overload, or critical component failure. The "centralized security means" (5) continuously monitors system health and integrity. Upon detecting a predefined critical event, it automatically transitions to a "read-only emergency access" mode. In this mode, all write, modification, or control operations to private resources (S1-Sm) are immediately blocked. Remote user sessions are automatically re-assigned a pre-configured, severely restricted "emergency profile" (Claim 1a) that only permits read-only access to a limited set of diagnostic or reporting resources. Furthermore, any existing Single Sign-On (SSO) sessions are immediately invalidated, and all subsequent access attempts, even for read-only resources, require re-authentication with mandatory multi-factor authentication, overriding the typical SSO convenience. This ensures minimal operational disruption while preventing further damage during a security incident.

stateDiagram-v2
    state "Normal Operation" as Normal
    state "Emergency Mode (Read-Only)" as Emergency

    Normal --> Emergency: Detected Security Breach / Overload
    Emergency --> Normal: System Recovery / Threat Mitigated

    Normal --> FirewallSecurity: Full Access (SSO Active)
    FirewallSecurity --> Resources: R/W Access Granted

    Emergency --> FirewallSecurity: Restricted Access (SSO Invalidated, MFA Enforced)
    FirewallSecurity --> Resources: Read-Only Access Only (Limited Subset)

    state FirewallSecurity {
        state "Authentication Module" as Auth
        state "Filtering Module" as Filter
        state "Profile Manager" as Profile
        Auth --> Filter: Authenticated User
        Filter --> Profile: Access Policy
        Profile --> Auth: Auth Challenge
    }

10. The "Inverse" or Failure Mode: Low-Power Standby with Minimal Authentication Services

Enabling Description:
This derivative outlines an "energy-saving" or "low-power standby" mode for the network architecture (Claim 8), particularly the firewall (2) and its "centralized security means" (5), for scenarios where remote access demand is minimal or non-existent (e.g., off-peak hours, remote site hibernation). In this mode, the main processing units of the firewall and the security server (S S) enter a low-power state, reducing energy consumption significantly. However, a minimal, always-on "wake-up authentication" module (a subset of the centralized security means) remains active. This module can perform basic authentication (Claim 1b, first stage) using a pre-configured, highly secure method (e.g., a specific OTP or a hardware-token-based challenge) to determine if a full system wake-up is required. Only upon successful authentication by this minimal module would the primary components of the firewall and security server transition back to full operational power, retrieving comprehensive security profiles (Claim 1b, second stage) and enabling full SSO functionality (Claim 2). All non-essential network interfaces and proxies (7a-7p) remain in a dormant state during low-power mode.

stateDiagram-v2
    state "Full Power Mode" as FullPower
    state "Low-Power Standby Mode" as LowPower

    FullPower --> LowPower: Low Activity / Scheduled Downtime
    LowPower --> FullPower: Wake-Up Authenticated Request

    LowPower: Minimal Authentication Module Active
    LowPower: Most Components Dormant
    LowPower --> WakeupAuth: Receive Request
    WakeupAuth --> FullPower: Authenticated Wake-Up

    FullPower: All Modules Active
    FullPower: Full SSO Functionality

    state WakeupAuth {
        state "Receive Initial OTP/Challenge" as Recv
        state "Verify Minimal Credential" as Verify
        state Recv --> Verify: Check OTP
        Verify --> WakeupAuth: Success/Fail
    }

Combination Prior Art Scenarios with Open-Source Standards

These scenarios describe combinations of US patent 6317838's core concepts with widely adopted open-source standards, demonstrating how the patented elements, or their obvious derivatives, would integrate with or be superseded by common industry practices.

1. Centralized Firewall Security with OpenID Connect for Federated SSO

  • Open-Source Standard: OpenID Connect (OIDC) - an authentication layer on top of the OAuth 2.0 framework.
  • Combination: A PHOSITA would combine the "centralized security means" (Claim 1b, 8) within the firewall (2) of US6317838 with OpenID Connect to enable federated Single Sign-On (SSO) for remote users. Instead of managing all user authentication data internally, the firewall would act as an OAuth 2.0 Client/Relying Party, delegating primary authentication to an external OpenID Provider (IdP) (e.g., Google, Microsoft Entra ID, or a corporate IdP using Keycloak). Upon successful authentication by the IdP, the firewall's centralized security means would receive an ID Token and potentially an Access Token. It would then use the information within the ID Token (e.g., user ID, roles) to fetch the appropriate "security profile" (Claim 1a, 8) from its internal "security storing means" (Claim 1a, 8) and enforce granular access rules to private resources. This approach leverages an established, secure, and widely implemented open standard for identity verification while retaining the centralized access control and filtering logic of the patent.

2. Firewall-Integrated SSO and OTP with FreeRADIUS and OpenLDAP

  • Open-Source Standard: FreeRADIUS (open-source RADIUS server) and OpenLDAP (open-source LDAP directory service).
  • Combination: A PHOSITA would integrate the "centralized security means" (Claim 1b, 8) and "security storing means" (Claim 1a, 8) of US6317838 with FreeRADIUS and OpenLDAP. The firewall's centralized security means would send authentication requests to a FreeRADIUS server, which, in turn, would authenticate users against an OpenLDAP directory storing "user's authentication data" (Claim 1a, 8) and potentially "security profiles" (Claim 1a, 8) or references to them. One-time passwords (Claim 7, 14) could be implemented by having the FreeRADIUS server integrate with a backend OTP generation mechanism (e.g., using OATH-TOTP/HOTP algorithms supported by many open-source implementations). The RADIUS server would also manage the "security profiles" (Claim 1a, 8) for users, dictating which private resources they can access, and relaying this authorization information back to the firewall for enforcement. This provides a robust, standardized, and centralized authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) framework that inherently supports SSO-like behavior for authorized sessions.

3. Secure Remote Access with OpenVPN and Netfilter/iptables for Application-Layer Filtering

  • Open-Source Standard: OpenVPN (open-source VPN solution for secure tunneling) and Netfilter/iptables (Linux kernel firewall, for packet filtering and Network Address Translation).
  • Combination: A PHOSITA would implement the "secured remote access" (Claim 1) and "firewall" (2) functionality of US6317838 using OpenVPN for establishing secure "data pipes" (VPN tunnels) and Netfilter/iptables for the "first set of filtering rules" (IP addresses filtering, module 20 in FIG. 2) and the "applicative services rules" (module 50 in FIG. 2). Remote users would first connect via an OpenVPN client, authenticating against a backend system (e.g., using client certificates, username/password, or even OTPs). Once the secure VPN tunnel is established, the "centralized security means" (Claim 1b, 8), potentially implemented as a daemon interacting with iptables rules, would perform "application-layer filtering" (e.g., Layer 7 inspection via Netfilter modules like l7-filter or conntrack) to enforce the "security profiles" (Claim 1a, 8) that permit or deny access to specific "private resources" (S1-Sm) or "Internet application protocols having a notion of authentication" (Claim 4) running within the trusted network. This combination leverages established open-source tools to provide both secure transport and granular application-level access control.

Generated 5/29/2026, 6:03:18 PM